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West Europe Report



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CALLS FOR DELAY IN CRUISE MISSILE DEPLOYMENT

Defense Expert De Boer

The Hague ANP NEWS BULLETIN in English 12 Jan 84 pp 2-3

[Text] Alphen aan de Rijn, 12 Jan--Dutch MP Joep de Boer, defense expert for the Christian Democratic Party (CDA), last night called for urgent reconsideration of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) 1979 deploy-and-talk decision.

De Boer, a middle-of-the-road politician within the CDA, senior partner of the Netherlands' ruling coalition, wants an extension of the cabinet deadline for deciding on whether to place nuclear missiles on Dutch soil.

It would be 'hardly responsible' to take a decision by June, as the cabinet now plans, he told a meeting at Alphen aan de Rijn.

Woensdrecht air base has already been named as a possible site for 48 new missiles to be sited from 1986 onwards and parliament has agreed to begin construction work there as soon as a firm siting decision has been made.

The Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers suggested before Christmas that reduction of the numbers to 16 might be considered.

'Arms Race Spiral'

De Boer said that under the terms of the NATO agreement, The Netherlands was not automatically obliged to agree to siting. He warned that siting medium-range missiles reduces the chance of a vital clear and unambiguous mutual deterrence.

The new Western sitings would lead to a new arms race spiral, and within a few years the balance of power would be no different from that in 1979, except that nuclear totals would have reached a higher level, he warned.

The NATO deploy-and-talk decision amounted to 'bargaining with the knives out,' and had achieved nothing, he said.

It was, therefore, vital that NATO urgently began to reconsider the current situation.

Plea by Buikema

The Hague ANP NEWS BULLETIN in English 23 Jan 84 pp 2, 3

[Text] The Hague, 23 Jan--A plea by a Dutch parliamentarian for a halt in deployment of NATO missiles in Europe has cast new doubt on the Lubbers government's ability to win approval for deployment of cruise missiles in The Netherlands.

Jan Buikema, a member of parliament for the Christian Democrats (CDA), the senior party in the government coalition, told a pacifist meeting on Saturday the North Atlantic Alliance should halt deployment to reactivate East-West arms reduction talks.

The Netherlands should not take any decision this year on whether to accept the 48 cruise missiles allocated to it under NATO plans, he added.

Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers' centre-right cabinet has said it will decide by June whether to accept the missiles and is meanwhile going ahead with deployment preparations. But the CDA and its rightwing coalition partner, the Liberals, hold only a narrow majority, with 79 seats in the 150-seat parliament.

The CDA parliamentary defence spokesman, Joop de Boer, also said this month the government should delay a decision, adding that the arrival of the first cruise missiles in Europe had quickened the arms race.

Right-Wing Support

NATO began deployment of U.S. medium-range cruise and Pershing missiles in Britain and West Germany late last year in what it says is a move to balance the Soviet SS-20's already deployed.

The CDA party quickly distanced itself from De Boer's comments, and he later emphasised he was speaking personally.

The latest remarks by Buikema have emphasised the fragility of the government's parliamentary majority on this issue.

Politicians and diplomats believe the cabinet is likely to want to go ahead with deployment of cruise in 1986 as planned because of the uncompromising Soviet stance at the broken-off Geneva talks.

The Liberals are mainly strong supporters of deployment. But the willingness of some CDA politicians to speak out against deployment showed they might vote against the government.

The politicians said the number doing so, or abstaining, would be small. But it would be enough to force the cabinet to rely on the support of small right-wing parties and cast doubt on the future cohesion of the coalition in parliament.

In his speech last night, Buikema said the CDA had the opportunity to break the spiralling arms race and that its decision on deployment should not be a foregone conclusion.

CSO: 3600/4

CHEYSSON ON EEC, DEFENSE, GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS, MID-EAST

Amsterdam ELSEVIERS MAGAZINE in Dutch 24 Dec 83 pp 42-45

[Interview with Claude Cheysson, French Minister of External Relations by G. Philip Mok in Paris: "Despite Athens Flop, Everyone Needs Europe"]

[Text] Claude Cheysson, the French Minister of External Relations, is a happy man when he looks at "his" nuclear plants. Claude Cheysson is not unhappy about Europe when he looks back at Athens. Minister Cheysson receives ELSEVIER in his Paris office.

[Question] The European summit meeting in Athens ended in a complete failure. Do you nevertheless see a future for the European Community?

[Cheysson] "Yes, of course," he roars. "Athens was a flop, that is certainly true. But surely one could not expect sudden agreement on all sorts of points which have been on the table for 10 years already. The problems were precisely those matters we have struggled with all those years. Modernization of the agricultural policy, for example. That was intended to cope with the situation of 20 years ago. But so much has changed. Now Europe is not only capable of meeting its own needs; we have a production surplus. Therefore Europe has the right to the same type of access to external markets as, for example, U.S. agriculture. That question was never properly dealt with. That must be done, otherwise we build up supplies which are expensive and will be superfluous. The forms of production have also changed. Previously a cow was an animal that ate grass. Now a cow is a sort of machine into which we introduce imported products. I don't say that's better or worse, but much has changed, and that has not been taken into account. The progress which was booked in Athens in spite of everything is that our differences of opinion have been clearly formulated. That creates the path to compromise. Now matters are /perfectly clear/. Alright, Athens was a failure. But the impact of that failure on the European public opinion is positive in my view. You are making that your first question. That fact alone I already find significant. Everyone agrees that it is a setback and a serious threat for the future of Europe. But no one can manage without Europe. Who would be able to do that? The Netherlands? The United Kingdom? The Federal Republic of Germany? No, indeed; they all have profited from Europe."

[Question] Surely Mrs Thatcher does not think that the United Kingdom has already reaped great benefits from the EEC?

[Cheysson] "Ah, I don't think she would say that publicly. But ask her industrialists how much profit they have made from the EEC. Ask them why they applied pressure at the time to have the United Kingdom join the EEC. When we started the EEC, the British National Product was 25 percent higher than the French. Now our GNP is 30 percent higher than the British. That is because of the European market; the British also look at that. Why do you think Japanese investments come to the United Kingdom? Because of the British market? Certainly not. It's because they can sell things on the European market via the United Kingdom."

[Question] France is blocking its own market for the Japanese in the area of video recorders and similar items. That also has disadvantages for the Netherlands, for example. Is that your policy, each one for himself?

[Cheysson] "No. Why do we do that? Because we believe that industries in Europe must not become foreign industries. But there can certainly be cooperation, on the condition that the strategy, the most important decision-making, is European. Otherwise not. Every European member state has benefited by the EEC. Just look at the FRG. Seen superficially, it has paid the most for the smallest yield. Nevertheless everyone agrees that that is the country which has benefited the most from the EEC. No, no one can afford another failure after the failure of Athens."

[Question] President Mitterand will have the task of giving leadership in looking for solutions.

[Cheysson] "And they will be found; I'm sure of it."

[Question] Just as awkward is another European problem which is sowing division in Europe: defense, the missile question. As you know, the peace movement in the Netherlands has gained considerable strength. Those who marched against nuclear armament were primarily your socialist friends. You have always said that the Pershing and Cruise missiles should be placed. Now Geneva has failed. Is that the ultimate proof for you that your analysis was correct?

[Cheysson] "The proof does not lie there. It springs from the fact that the Soviets placed medium range missiles in Europe which can reach Europe but not the United States. The result is that the American nuclear deterrence is not automatically effective. The balance of power is upset. And no one can deny--not even the peace movements do that--that there has to be a balance. Thus the Pershings and cruise missiles are needed."

[Question] The Pershings and cruise missiles are not being stationed in France.

[Cheysson] "No. But you might say that we already have our missiles, on our own soil. And there has never been any serious criticism of it in our country."

[Question] Is that because the French, even the communists, are convinced of the need for a strong defense?

[Cheysson] "Certainly. The communists here say--and we agree with them--that nuclear armament should be at the lowest possible level. As far as they are concerned there should be /nothing/ on both sides."

[Question] Actually, everyone would like that. But you have the French /Force de Frappe/. Do you believe that developments have proved that it was a good thing for France at the time to abandon the military part of NATO, and that now it is actually being proven how great the need is for a separate, independent military and nuclear force in Europe?

[Cheysson] "Good or not good is not the problem. Each nation has its own motivations and evaluation of situations. Who could imagine that /France/ would accept being dependent on any other country with respect to something as vital as our defense? Therefore France /had to/ have its own nuclear force. It's as simple as that."

[Question] You got to know Soviet President Andropov personally. As far as you can judge, will the Soviets return to the Geneva negotiation table?

[Cheysson] "I hope so; I think they will. They thought they could separate Europe's defense from the Atlantic defense through public opinion. Their activity was especially aimed at the FRG which the Soviets have wanted to neutralize for centuries already. The support of Western public opinion had to prevent the placing of missiles in Europe and hence create that neutralization. Their entire calculation proved to be wrong. They evaluated the role of public opinion in our countries incorrectly and it is an enormous shock to them now that the missiles are indeed being placed. You find it alarming that they left the negotiation table. What I find much more alarming is that they could make such a mistake, that they did not understand the laws of our democracy. If such demonstrations had taken place in the Soviet Union, the entire system would have collapsed. They don't understand that what could cause such serious consequences for them is simply an expression of democracy in our countries. But I don't think that their shock over that will be decisive. I hope they will accept the facts as they are; they are realists. Thus on the basis of the facts there will be renewed negotiations."

[Question] [line missing] in general optimistic, positive. Are the French greater realists?

[Cheysson] "I don't know. It is an interesting question, but I don't know the answer. I would say: why are you so different? Perhaps others don't see this basic fact: the atom is the deterrence which was invented to make war impossible and it is still doing that. We want to be independent; therefore we have a nuclear force. That is simple for us. The atom has never had that strange aspect of deep fear in France as encountered elsewhere. We don't have problems with our nuclear power plants either, even though we are the country in the world which produces the greatest part of its energy through nuclear power plants. Those plants are a subject of pride in the areas where they are located. When strangers come, they are right away invited to visit the plants."

[Question] Those plants are even built along the Autoroute du Soleil, the highway to the Riviera, which means that everyone very happily drives by it while going to his vacation destination.

[Cheysson] "I can tell you that every Monsieur Dupont, every French John Doe who rides there tells his children: 'Let's stop for a moment. Do you see that plant there? It is tremendous. It is modern, pretty; it does not pollute; it is completely safe, and there has never been one accident.' He is very proud of it."

[Question] And do you think just like Monsieur Dupont?

[Cheysson] "Yes, I do indeed. And I can assure you; it is very pleasant to feel that way."

[Question] There are still other topics of vital interest. You are known as someone with very outspoken ideas on the Middle East. We have had the attack on Kuwait, also on the French Embassy; there was that hideous suicide action in Lebanon. How do you see those matters?

[Cheysson] "I don't think you can talk about one particular country in the Middle East without touching on all the problems there. But let me start with Lebanon. We recognize the right of the Lebanese people, just as that of any other nation including that of Israel and the Palestinians, for a future in their own country."

[Question] By far most of the Palestinians live in Jordan. Therefore the Israelis say that there is already a Palestinian state: Jordan.

[Cheysson] "Well, that is not yet--wait; I should not say /yet/--their own country. But we maintain that as long as both rights, those of Israel and the Palestinians, are not accepted and respected, there is no chance for peace. Take Lebanon. How can there be peace there with 300,000 to 400,000 Palestinians who form an extraneous body, who cannot go anywhere else? Our policy is strongly inspired by the principle I mentioned. Further, we cannot accept a division of Lebanon. We have had commitments toward Lebanon for 50 or 60 years already, or actually for centuries already. It was rather remarkable that Lebanon was able to exist as an Arab country with various religions, such a strong democracy with freedom of opinion, with such a large degree of liberalism and, simultaneously, so prosperous. That must be recreated. As to the Palestinians: I believe they must get a future. I do not find it acceptable as such that Israel is keeping certain areas occupied. We think an end should come to that through negotiation."

[Question] You supported the Camp David Accords.

[Cheysson] "Indeed; we supported the idea that there could be peace between two countries, Egypt and Israel. But the Palestinian problem must also be solved."

[Question] Camp David created a framework for that--in the words of President Carter--in which Jordan, amongst others, was invited to be part of the negotiations. Just recently Israel appealed to it again to join the peace process.

[Cheysson] "Yes, but. . ."

[Question] I'll finish my question. Alright, everyone understands that the Palestinian people have rights. You have always had good contacts with the PLO, with Yasir Arafat. But when we see how Arafat--and I know something about your background; you were in the resistance in World War II, so you can understand my concern--repeatedly stated that the Israelis must be seen as worse than the Nazis, which is the worst insult one could address to any Jew, and that they continue to act that way in Lebanon, then how can one expect the psychological momentum to grow for Israel's negotiating with a party that takes such a position. The PLO

wants to create the impression that there are concentration camps and gas chambers in Lebanon. That is nonsense, of course. But how can Israel take people seriously who take that position?

[Cheysson] "I don't have to judge Mr Arafat. But as to that particular statement: it was a shocking, very shocking, error. There are other errors. The fact that Mr Arafat just now gave his blessing to that hideous terrorist action against civilians in a bus in Jerusalem is also shocking and unacceptable."

[Question] But it is not exactly new.

[Cheysson] "I think that these sorts of errors sometimes ruin the credibility of the PLO. Yet the PLO represents most of the fighters. And if an end to the fighting is to occur, there has to be a time of discussion with the representatives of the Palestinian fighters. You cannot split up the problem; the Palestinians in and outside of Israel and the occupied areas form one nation. There has to be someone who can commit himself on behalf of that nation and for the time being we see no one but Yasir Arafat. As you know, this argument was accepted by the ten states of the EEC."

[Question] Yes, I know that, and I must say I don't really understand too well which PLO one is talking about when we see that that movement is now fighting itself.

[Cheysson] "There is one PLO, which was confirmed at a very democratic congress in Algiers a few months ago. That is the PLO as we see it."

[Question] The one which still has the destruction of Israel in its Charter.

[Cheysson] "That is their business. We need a Palestinian entity; I mean that there must be someone one can negotiate with. I believe that Arafat still has a following."

[Question] One last question: what do you think about NATO Secretary General Luns' succession by the British Lord Carrington?

[Cheysson] "I am not objective; I like Peter Carrington. He has great talent. Someone is needed again who is an independent personality and has talent. Mr Luns proved to be such a person. I am sure that Peter Carrington will also prove himself."

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CS0: 3614/27

FORMER BERLIN FDP LEADER RESIGNS, ATTACKS PARTY

Berlin DER TAGESSPIEGEL in German 8 Dec 83 p 2

[Text] FDP parliamentarian Prof Juergen Kunze left his party yesterday and is now an independent in the Berlin House of Delegates. Kunze, 38, has been an FDP member since 1964 and had been FDP state chairman from February 1981 until March of this year. He fought bitterly against forming the coalition between CDU and FDP in Berlin and Bonn; in the House of Delegates, he frequently did not vote with his party group and thus became increasingly isolated.

When asked whether he might join some other party, such as the "Liberal Democrats" founded by former left-wing FDP members, Kunze said yesterday that he would have no comment at this time.

In a press release, Kunze based his decision on the "overall FDP policy since its turnaround in fall of 1982." He could no longer justify politically the positions held by the party. Kunze mentioned three areas: "The policy of catch-up armament is wrong and dangerous, in my opinion." The defense and development of citizens' rights "has become peripheral to the real interests of the FDP." For example, freedom of opinion, freedom to demonstrate, protection of information and foreigners' rights "had become a political plaything in a conservative coalition." The economic and social policies of the FDP "are characterized by a high degree of social ruthlessness, due to a dogmatic narrowing to self-healing market forces."

Charlottenburg FDP Shares His Criticism

In a press statement, the Charlottenburg FDP regrets Kunze's resignation from the party but stresses at the same time that it shares to a large degree his criticism of present party policies. Yet these policies can only be changed from within the party. Kunze was abandoning his Charlottenburg party friends at a time when the Berlin FDP has resumed discussion of the points criticized. It is totally incomprehensible that Kunze--also measured against his own democratic standards--does not resign his seat in the House of Delegates.

After Kunze's resignation, the FDP--the smallest party group--has only six delegates left. In the 132-member House of Delegates in Berlin, however, the coalition together with the 65 CDU delegates still has four votes more than the absolute majority of members.

TRADE UNION LEADER URGES SPD NOT TO ALIENATE PARTY REGULARS

Duesseldorf HANDELSBLATT in German 8 Dec 83 p 7

[Article by "na" datelined Duesseldorf: "The SPD Must Pay Particular Attention to Party Regulars"]

[Text] Siegfried Bleicher, member of the executive board of the German Trade Union Federation [DGB] and the SPD trade union council, warned the SPD not to get into the political isolation of a continuing security debate.

Speaking at the SPD industrial group conference "Schalker Verein" of the firm of Thyssen, Gelsenkirchen, Bleicher was of the opinion that the SPD would be ill advised if the past rejection of new medium-range missiles were followed by a rejection of the Western alliance. Although a majority of the FRG population evidently is against deployment of new missiles, at the same time a majority professes adherence to the Western orientation of the FRG.

Tolerance Towards Dissenters

In Bleicher's opinion, a rejection of the Western alliance would be not only incompatible with societal principles and values of Social Democratic policy, but would also have catastrophic electoral consequences. The SPD leadership must now consider which concept of security policy it is to pursue, after SPD rejection of missile deployment. Tolerance towards dissenting groups within the party, and the necessary organizational unity of the SPD, would also have to be taken into consideration.

Bleicher called upon the SPD to take an active part during the coming months in economic and employment policies. Especially working people expect from the SPD well thought-out and viable ideas to overcome the unemployment crisis. Bleicher advised the SPD to abandon economic ideas which were exclusively market-oriented. A saturated national economy, exclusively oriented towards an application of market rules, would necessarily produce antisocial consequences which could be reconciled with neither the dictates of a social state, nor with the right to work.

A future economic and employment concept of the SPD must not be identical with political "borrowings" from the often muddleheaded economic ideas of the Greens and the Alternatives. SPD economic policy must continue to be

predicated on an industrial society based on the division of labor for employment, standard of living and quality of life of the working population.

Concepts such as investment management, basic planning of the national economy, qualified co-determination and humanizing of labor must through practical policy be freed from the stigma of collectivism and be put into a context which shows that the interests of the working population are central to the SPD.

Working people continue to be regular SPD voters. Industrial workers continue to be the core of these regular voters. To ensure future election successes, Social Democrats must first of all "cater to" these party regulars and their core.

Social Changes Must be Considered

A policy which in essence and appearance is oriented exclusively towards a voter potential which supposedly stands to the "left of center," will hardly lead to a parliamentary majority. Technological changes with ensuing social changes, as well as a change of consciousness in many working groups, make it necessary for the SPD to give up--not without pain--those political positions which the public considers the political center. The political center must not be defined only from one's own standpoint, but must also be established with a view to prevailing political power relationships and basic trends of society.

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CSO: 3620/128

RIFTS AMONG GREENS OVER SECURITY POLICY CONGRESS

Munich SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 13 Dec 83 p 6

[Text] The party leadership of the Greens publicly disavowed the security policy congress in Bonn to which the parliamentary group of the Greens had invited some 40 members of foreign peace movements. On Monday, the speaker of the party's federal executive Board, Rainer Trampert, cancelled his participation in a press conference after his attendance had previously been announced by his party group. At the press conference, Member of Parliament Roland Vogt explained the demand to hold a "conference of survival" simultaneously with the opening of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence Building Measures and Disarmament (KVAE).

In Vogt's words, at this meeting the world is to be presented with the "wishes of the peace movement and of the peoples for true disarmament." The congress, financed by the Green party group with DM 10,000, appealed to the 35 nations participating in the KVAE (which is to begin 17 January) to work towards establishing nuclear-free zones, converting armaments industry to production of consumer goods, and to "make progressive, annual cuts" in the defense budgets in favor of development aid. The conference also discussed a proposal to form "a human chain across Europe"--crossing bloc and national borders--at Easter. It was also demanded that the peace movement be imbued, in East and West, with "a new quality." This is to be accomplished by working for a renunciation of NATO catch-up armament in the West, and by demanding more human rights in the East bloc.

In a press release, the Green party leadership criticized the fact that the federal executive board had not been involved in the preparation or implementation of the congress, and had only been informed of its taking place shortly before its start. The party leadership warned that "if statements are made at the press conference concerning the European and peace policies of the Greens, they will reflect exclusively the opinion of the congress participants." Vogt talked about a "communication problem" between the federal executive board and the parliamentary group.

Trampert stated that there are no rifts among the Greens on questions of security policy. The federal executive board considers the proposals developed in the conference as suggestions for further discussion within the Green party and the peace movement, but wants to emphasize that not all of

them are necessarily positions on which a consensus can be reached. Especially the proposal that the Greens favor a self-organized opinion poll on catch-up armament, which is to take place simultaneously with the European elections on 17 June 1984, is strictly the personal opinion of parliamentary member Roland Vogt.

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CS0: 3620/130

PROBLEMATIC EVOLUTION OF SPD-GREEN RELATIONSHIP

Varieties of Green Response

Munich SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 28 Dec 83 p 5

[Article datelined Saarbruecken: "Greens Rethink Their Relationship With the SPD." Opposing Ideas of the State Party Federations on Cooperation]

[Text] Under the impact of intensive negotiations between the SPD and the Greens in Hesse, the Greens in other federal states are also considering an alliance with the Social Democrats. After the Greens at a state party congress in North Rhine-Westphalia agreed to cooperation with the SPD, looking to the state elections in 1985, their party friends in the Saarland also expressed their willingness to cooperate. SPD state manager Kurt Gruenewald stated, "the Greens--while maintaining their identity--must transform arithmetic parliamentary majorities into political majorities." The goal must be to replace the CDU/FDP government in the next state elections and to make possible a Red-Green cooperation.

In the opinion of the Greens in the Saarland, the municipal elections in June 1984 "will already have a directional significance." Mayor Lafontaine, SPD state chairman, "will have to explain to the voters why he continues to hold fast to the FDP as a coalition partner in Saarbruecken and refuses cooperation with the Greens." In the municipal elections, the voter in Saarbruecken will have to decide whether he wants a continued alliance between SPD and FDP, or if he wants an alliance between SPD and the Greens.

Although Lafontaine welcomed the Greens' willingness to cooperate with his party, he stated in a radio interview that it is the SPD goal in the 1985 state elections "to win a strong, absolute majority." Should this fail, his party would cooperate with that grouping which has the same goal and is willing to compromise with the SPD.

In the view of the Greens' federal executive board in Bonn, the Greens in North Rhine-Westphalia did not erect a new milestone in their state party congress. The basic attitude will remain that coalitions with the SPD are out of the question, but that SPD minority governments could be tolerated under certain conditions. In North Rhine-Westphalia, one would first await the outcome of the municipal elections in September 1984. In that state,

cooperation would also mean a common concept for the steel industry in which job security would take center stage.

With regard to the attitude of the so-called fundamentalists in the party who strongly reject cooperation with the SPD, the federal executive board stated that this group at present is reexamining its position. In their case, some chance is seen that, in case of cooperation, certain matters could be "moved along."

According to a dpa poll, the Greens in Schleswig-Holstein are following the line of the federal executive board. State manager Heino Schomaker stated that, with regard to the decision of his party friends in North Rhine-Westphalia, a coalition with the SPL is being rejected because of the fundamental differences in policies, "because of the responsibility for the protest and alternative movement, and because of the necessity for a qualitative change in politics generally." With regard to North Rhine-Westphalia, one must question how an acceptable result of the negotiations is even thinkable if one "gives up an important lever, i.e., the 'Green-tinged' sections of the SPD." In this respect, an important element of opposition is being relinquished.

In Baden-Wuerttemberg, a small party meeting of the Greens accused the SPD of a lack of substance and profile. They said that, since the founding of this Southwestern state, the SPD had been incapable of breaking the CDU majority. With this sharp criticism the Greens reacted to SPD accusations that the Greens are "politically incapable" and are the cause of a CDU government.

According to their own statements, the party in Berlin is only in the beginning stages of discussion. Opinions differ on "whether a policy is feasible with the SPD, in which the Alternative List (AL) can achieve its program ideas," as was stated with reference to developments since Richard von Weizsaecker's departure. It must be studied whether, and in what form, a replacement of the CDU/FDP senate could be prepared. A different AL spokesman thought that, depending on majority conditions in 1985, the SPD front-running candidate Harry Pistock should be elected mayor unconditionally "and then he will have to see what he can accomplish with us."

In Lower Saxony, the question of a coalition with the SPD has not yet arisen because of the clear-cut majority situation (the CDU has an absolute majority). In the opinion of political observers, however, it is openminded towards cooperation. The Greens and the SPD have repeatedly taken common initiatives in individual specialized matters, such as policies regarding foreigners, protection of information, and peace policy.

SPD Exercises 'Patience'

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG in German 8 Dec 83 p 4

[Article by Bernd Erich Heptner datelined Wiesbaden 7 Dec: "The Greens and Their View of the State"]

[Text] In negotiations with the SPD, when the Hessian Greens elucidate their understanding of law and constitution, the Social Democratic negotiation partners generally make a show of not listening and try to change subjects as quickly as possible. According to their own statements, the Social Democrats have decided not to be provoked by Green self-representations "of a political nature" and instead to stick to concrete individual measures to be agreed upon in the negotiations for the desired parliamentary cooperation. As one member of the negotiation team put it, the SPD prescribed "forebearance" for itself. This leads to a situation in the negotiations where statements and claims by the Greens remain largely unopposed, although they ought to be considered by the SPD as insults to their views of state and law.

There is also no reaction by the Social Democrats to the support which the Greens in the state legislature lend to the "blockade" of the U.S. military field in Frankfurt-Hausen planned for this weekend, and to the announcement that Green legislators will take part in it. During the election campaign, incumbent Minister President Boerner still maintained that the Greens could become a partner to the SPD only if and when they clarified their relationship vis-a-vis the legal and constitutional order of the FRG. Ever since the Social Democrats have been eying the Greens as political partners, such demands are not only no longer made, but much is being done to improve the climate of the talks.

For example, the state government indicated to the Frankfurt airport, and to the police, that at present--while negotiations are under way--it is not interested in starting the forest-clearing work needed for the electricity installation for Runway West. And on Wednesday, in deference to the Greens, in the State Legislature's budget committee the SPD turned down the FDP offer to pass a partial investment budget this year which the SPD had considered reasonable, while the Greens had seen it as a "provocation." Instead, the SPD and the Greens settled on the least common denominator and want to push through this year the equalization of financial burdens for municipalities.

What comes through in the negotiations is the fact that the Greens see the state as an enemy which it is always "legitimate" to fight. For instance, no one in these negotiations contradicts Green delegate Kern who--in reference to the violent clashes over the Frankfurt airport and the ensuing lawsuits against opponents of the new runway--talks about "the revenge of the state" against citizens "who have to take their interests into their own hands." When Boerner later pointed out that, weekend after weekend, the game preserve fences around the reforestation area at the edge of the new runway were torn down by the opponents of the runway, the Greens considered this remark a "mockery" of those people who had opposed Runway West, and still do so. For the Greens, the fight over the runway is not over by a long shot.

QUESTIONS RAISED ON SORSA APPOINTMENT TO USSR TRADE PANEL

Prime Minister's Prestige in Talks

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 18 Dec 83 p 2

[Commentary by Johannes Koroma: "Sorsa Took Home A Giant Pot from Moscow"]

[Text] Was Prime Minister Kalevi Sorsa's appointment to the Finnish chairman of the trade panel--a matter that has been discussed for a long time--the right solution?

Many people were during the past week eagerly waiting for an answer from Moscow to this disputed question of internal politics which has maybe reached unreasonable proportions.

After the meeting, which could in a certain sense be called a historic event, those who had opposed Sorsa's election found it harder than before to present reasons on the necks of the counselors of mining of industry, because the businessmen benefitted from this choice, while those who were competing for the chairman's position were besides Sorsa mainly Jermy Laine and Ahti Pekkala.

The position and the power of the prime minister were both seen and felt at the trade panel. The change was clearly obvious also in other aspects than the choice of meeting locations.

Without in any way putting down bank president Ahti Karjalainen's judgment and accomplishment, the change was felt as much as there is difference between the president of the Bank of Finland and the prime minister of the Finnish Government.

Completely separately and significantly later it will be possible to evaluate the effect that the concentrating of political power to one party and to few people might mean in Finland. It is, however, questionable, as it always is when power is concentrated, but the chairmanship of the trade panel is not the only way to divide up the power.

The fact that Finland's and Soviet's prime ministers met and that Foreign Minister Paavo Vayrynen and Prime Minister Nikolai Tihonov did not meet puts an end to this discussion in more than a symbolic sense.

Although such a meeting has usually been part of the program during previous foreign minister visits, there was a reasonable reason for it to be missing from Vayrynen's program: it would indeed have been unreasonable if the prime minister of the Soviet Union would have had to reserve time during two consecutive days for discussions with two representatives from the Finnish Government.

On the otherhand, one should, of course, remember that the symbolism of the Soviet protocol is carefully known and practiced.

The positive spirit of the trade negotiations is in many aspects a historic paradox to the poor spirit that generally dominates the relationship between the East and the West.

At the same time as more and more doors to the common discussion arenas of the East and West are closing, an increasing number of doors between Finland and the Soviet Union are opening.

One could continue the symbolism.

Some time ago an American style congress hotel that was intended to become the base for American businessmen was built in Moscow. The decision to build it was made in an atmosphere of detente, but when the trade center was finished, there was not much left of the detente.

Thus the congress spaces and increasingly also the office spaces of the hotel have become filled with Finnish businessmen instead of American businessmen. And for now one week a larger number of them than ever before had gathered there.

The results of the negotiations, as well as the discussions held in the process, including the visit of Foreign Minister Vayrynen, do not give any support to the guesswork that has been presented in some places that the atmosphere would be getting cooler between our countries.

This guesswork is now, as so often before, more an indication of ignorance than of knowledge, of suspicion more than trust.

The communique of Vayrynen's visit has been ready for weeks and the trade agreement was also made in a normal manner in an atmosphere that was colored by Nikolay Patolichev's jovial sense of humor.

When the final result is evaluated, there is reason to remember how closely foreign policies and foreign trade are linked together in the USSR in particular.

This is where the special importance of the meeting between Vayrynen and Andrey Gromyko lies, for Gromyko's duties include the coordination of the foreign policy guidelines and the trade relations. It is, on the other hand, reported that the subject of discussion in Sorsa's and Tihonov's meeting was only trade policy matters.

The appreciation of the relationship with Soviet in the development of the careers of Finnish politicians has not been unnoticed in the context of the commission and the trade negotiations.

Vice Chairmen Jermu Laine and Ahti Pekkala are careful about how they appear during these negotiations and their information meetings. And it did not pass unnoticed either, how often Jermu Laine had something of importance to add to Sorsa's statements.

But for the Finnish chairman of the trade panel there remained a fairly large problem to solve especially in the negotiations at a political level. And here, if anywhere, are Prime Minister Sorsa's authority and position needed to solve this problem.

The almost completed ship deals with the Soviet Union are awaiting their completion until the financing arrangements are finally agreed upon. The biggest problem is the fact that Soviet wants to change the payment system so that only one-fourth of the purchase money will be paid during the construction work and the remainder when the ships are delivered. To the Finnish shipyards that are used to cash deals it means financing arrangements in the billiard range for trade arrangements in the billiard range. The change means a financing need of about 2,000 million marks.

Money will surely be found, but a financier is still being sought because the change in the financing arrangements increases the shipyard expenses by 8-10 percent or a total of several hundred million marks.

Both Pekkala and Laine have said that the agreement concerning the financier is a matter between the buyer and the seller. It was repeatedly stated also in the negotiations that the change naturally will affect the prices. The Soviet people are, on the other hand, known to be hard negotiators. The Finns are, therefore, still strained until these deals are completed.

The change in the payment system is said to be caused by a balance of trade surplus, but the surplus has subsequently clearly diminished and there is no longer a problem.

The shipyards are continuing their discussions again in January, but help will surely be asked and expected from Chairman Sorsa, whose second disappointment seemed to have been the postponing of the natural gas agreement at least until January. The political pressure for a fast natural gas deal leads to a questioning of an agreement that has been made fast but within a narrow framework.

Communist Paper on Sorsa's Roles

Helsinki KANSAN UUTiset in Finnish 23 Dec 83 p 2

[Editorial: "Sorsa's Main Roles and His Side Interests"]

[Text] Prime Minister-Party Leader Kalevi Sorsa has undoubtedly learned the ways of a skillful politician during the past few years: He emphasizes and

brings into the general discussion his withdrawal from his high duties at a time when the political sky around him is actually disgustingly dirty.

The left-wing opposition within his party disappeared long ago in the four winds; Sorsa has taken in his political sails and learned how to sail so slowly, that the right wing is not able to subject his person to any significant criticism. The right wing has not been able to do that for a long time. The years have changed Sorsa into a remarkable statesman for our conditions.

It is very exhausting to be a top politician and it demands a total commitment. There is hardly time left for side interests, which in Sorsa's case involve the finesses of esthetics and poetry. There is thus no need to question the need for seclusion. But 3 years is a long time. During that time the need might weaken. Around him also emerge both people who eagerly wish that he would withdraw and those who oppose it.

And on his road as a statesman Sorsa does indeed have the possibility to step over one high threshold. In connection with such a possible step a pause to spend some time in seclusion would simply be an advantage.

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CSO: 3617/65

COMMUNIST PARTY CONGRESS MAY SEE MODERATE, RADICAL FIGHT

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 18 Dec 83 p 23

[Article by Janne Virkkunen: "Communist Crisis"]

[Text] The leadership of the SKP [Finnish Communist Party] which has lost its support, is quarelling over party policy. The congress in the spring will determine whether the Kajanoja line or the Aalto line will prevail.

The Finnish Communist Party is a member organization of the SKDL [Finnish People's Democratic League]. Of the SKDL's 27 MP's only four do not belong to the Communist Party.

Thirteen of the group's members belong to the Communist majority faction and ten belong to the minority faction.

The SKDL received 13.4 percent of the votes in the 1983 elections and a total of 400,483 votes. Four years earlier the percentage was 17.9 and the number of voters was 518,045.

SKDL support was even less in the electoral elections of the president, in which 11.0 percent of the voters voted for SKDL candidates.

At that time 348,359 voters belonged to the basic constituency of the SKDL.

The Finnish Communist Party has squabbled throughout its stormy history. Chairman Jouko Kajanoja is attempting to retain his shaky position in the current power struggle.

A significant policy dispute involving fundamental principles is also being resolved in the SKP: the attitude toward cooperation. General Secretary Arvo Aalto is attempting to lead the SKP back to the path of cooperation between the center and the left and to influence policy and the country's development from within.

Kajanoja radicalized the SKP with the support of the Taistoite minority and considers his leadership task to be the restoration of SKP unity. The policy line that will prevail will be determined next May at the the SKP's 20th Congress.

It is no surprise, much less a revelation, that the ranks of the Communists are in a state of disarray. The headquarters of the SKP, the House of Culture in Helsinki, is lacking a leadership which would be capable of making unified policy. In addition to a crisis of support, the Communists have a crisis of leadership.

There are all kinds of policy lines represented in the party now only 6 months away from the forthcoming congress: the majority's majority, the majority's minority, the minority's majority, and the minority's minority. An attempt will be made to extract from these policy lines a majority capable of acting and making decisions, selecting a leadership, and pointing out a policy line at the congress.

A clarification of the situation is made difficult by the fact the chairman and the general secretary are clearly of a different opinion regarding policy. This dispute, which has been smoldering for a long time already, was made public in the SKP Central Committee a little less than a month ago.

Jouko Kajanoja expressed in the Central Committee a naive political view, which his party comrades would like to forget. The chairman of the SKP announced, among other things, that the time for a reform policy based on mutual understanding is past.

Kajanoja sharply criticized the fact that the Communists continued the "previous policy of cooperation" for such a long time. The reference to government cooperation of the left and the center was quite clear. And Kajanoja's knowledge of the matter should not be doubted, indeed he was a minister when the SKDL was forced out of the government at the end of 1982.

Also Kajanoja's criticism of the old government policy meant that his views are becoming closer to the party's minority, which has always opposed Communist participation in the present type of government cooperation.

In the Central Committee Kajanoja urged Communists to learn from past mistakes and announced that "our problem is that Sorsa and even Pekkala should be made to accomplish our economic policy as the result of mass pressure".

Offended by this were the old majority Communists, for whom the standardbearer has become Arvo Aalto, who lost to Kajanoja in the SKP's chairmanship election in the spring of 1982.

Aalto has talked about realism in the Central Committee already, but he returned to this subject just before Independence Day in Oulu. There he berated Kajanoja -- indeed without mentioning him by name: "Revolutionary jingoism will not help us. Only those who lack a sense of reality can think that we could participate in a cooperation of democratic forces merely by organizing mass actions under present relatively stable political conditions."

Aalto was concerned about the possibility that the intent is to replace the SKDL with the SMP [Finnish Rural Party] and even with the Conservative Party as an ally of the SDP and the center bourgeoisie.

The Communists have a definite need to point out their existence in a situation in which the SMP has been in the government for 6 months, a government which just concluded a budget agreement with the Conservative Party.

The change compared with a year ago is considerable: at that time the SKDL was still in the government instead of the SMP, and there was no need to be concerned about the Conservative Party at all.

The definite perception now in the SKP and the SKDL is that the present government base will not last until October's municipal elections, but it will disintegrate in the fall with the compiling of the 1985 budget. This is a possibility that must be considered at least in the opinion of the Communists.

Therefore, Aalto wanted to emphasize the desire and readiness in principle of the Communists to return to the old government base. Kalevi Sorsa as well as Paavo Vayrynen have demonstrated an understanding in principle of Aalto's thinking. But the Communists must first resolve their internal problems.

Aalto was also supported by SKDL Chairman Kalevi Kivisto, who could not refrain from poking fun at Kajanoja in the SKDL Executive Committee. According to Kivisto, the Politburo must not just be a forum for expressing feelings and dealing with the moods of a politician.

The criterion should be that which occurs in reality and not what it seems to be to the policymaker, stated Kivisto.

But what was more important than government policy was Aalto's message to his own people, who are making preparations for the 20th Congress. There it will be determined whether Kajanoja will be able to retain his shaky position at the head of the SKP, a position to which he was elected in May 1982 at the chaotic extraordinary congress.

At that time the Taistoites withdrew from the party leadership as a protest to the fact that the majority had narrowed down the mainority's positions and had dropped Taisto Sinisalo, the leader of the Taistoites, from the the position of SKP vice-chairman.

During that same summer Kajanoja negotiated a conciliatory solution with Sinisalo, which restored formal unity to the party. In the opinion of many members of the majority Kajanoja's fundamental mistake -- a favorable attitude toward the minority -- began at that time.

According to the critics, it would have been better if the Taistoites had been left to their own resources and had been forced to return to the party with their tail between their legs prior to the parliamentary elections.

But the opposite happened: with the help of a skillful concentration of votes the Taistoites succeeded in increasing their relative share in the parliamentary group in the catastrophic 1983 elections, in which the SKDL lost eight seats.

After the elections the majority's hard line attempted to discipline the Taistoites, but Kajanoja succeeded in putting off a decision so long that the hard line lost its steam.

Part and parcel of this same tangle is the Communists' peculiar press solution, by which Kajanoja believes unity will be restored to the SKP. The purpose is to create an organ for the SKP along side of KANSAN UUTISET, but the new paper YHTEISTYÖ has encountered difficulties already before its regular publication.

The timing of the newspaper project will most likely be clarified in February at the latest at a meeting of the Central Committee. The utopian goal of the newspaper plan is to suspend the publication of the Taistoite TIEDONANTAJA from the beginning of July, but it is doubtful that anyone in the Communist Party believes this will happen.

Now the party's old Saarenenite majority is solidifying its ranks in order to acquire a dominant position again and place the party under its command. Its condition is that the chairman be replaced.

Suitable candidates have already been considered: Aalto himself, Jarmo Wahlstrom, the former chairman of the SKDL parliamentary faction, Deputy Chairman Olavi Hanninen of the SAK [Finnish Confederation of Trade Unions], and Chairman Aarno Aitamurto of the Construction Workers' Union.

The settings for the SKP congress will not begin to form until the party vote, which will be concluded in the middle of February. The unpredictability of the party rank and file is increased by the exchange of membership books, which reduced party membership to 30,000 Communists.

In spite of this, a membership vote cannot produce any kind of a revolution since the SKP's organizations are so rigidly solidified. Thus the majority will continue to control nine districts and the minority eight districts.

On the other hand, what is decisive is whether the divided ranks of the majority will be able to unite themselves -- whether it will be able to push through the personnel selections and policy line it considers to be correct.

It is also a question of the kind of force of that can be assembled at the congress by those who are thoroughly fed up with the mutual squabbling and want to be free of all factionalist thinking. Kajanoja has some opportunities in this group in that he can count on the support of the minority.

General Secretary Aalto estimated that "it is quite probable" that a majority capable of action will come together at the congress.

Aalto is prepared to postpone discussions on personnel decisions at the congress until later in the spring. In answer to the question as to whether he himself is a candidate for the chairman of the SKP Aalto answers as follows: "No. At least that is not my intention today."

"I have told those who have asked that it is possible and even reasonable for me to approach the election of a party leadership in such a way that these issues will be discussed after elections at the congress have been held and after it is possible to consider what is possible and what is reasonable within the framework of available opportunities."

The general secretary discourages the more enthusiastic who are ferreting out policy differences between him and the chairman. Aalto states that he has spoken with Kajanoja, and in those discussions it has become evident that there does not need to be such a clear conflict between them as is apparent from their speeches.

Aalto states that he has presented his own serious opinion of the government question as well as a way to resolve it. A common ground for the preparations for the party congress can be found according to Aalto from the fact that "policy lines which will provide an impetus for active management should be formulated" at the congress.

Aalto was a labor minister in the government in the years 1977--81 and declares that the SKDL did not lack opportunities to influence the content of cooperation. Talk that this would be possible in the future is either a total lack of understanding or a desire to explain issues in an unrealistic light, states Aalto.

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ESTIER ON PSF POLICIES ON EUROPEAN ELECTIONS, EEC, PCF RELATIONS

Paris LE QUOTIDIEN DE PARIS in French 10 Jan 84 p 10

[Interview with Claude Estier, chairman of the foreign affairs committee of the National Assembly, by Florence Muracciole; date and place not specified]

[Text] From today until Saturday Paris will take its cue from Socialist Europe, for the avenue Kleber conference center will host the Socialist group of the European parliament from the 10th through 12th, and the congress of the European Socialist movement on the 13th and 14th. The initial phase of deliberations will concern the presidency of the Council of European Communities, which has just fallen to France for 6 months, and to the agenda for the plenary session of the European parliament to be held in Strasbourg from 16 to 20 January. The second will deal more particularly with European recovery. In that altogether European context and on the eve of the elections which will determine the deputies to be sent to Strasbourg, LE QUOTIDIEN asked foreign affairs committee chairman Claude Estier to explain the PS position on Europe and the way the party will conduct the campaign leading to the 17 June elections.

[Question] The European elections will be held June 17. In your view, should they be transformed into a referendum on domestic policy, or should they retain a European character?

[Answer] I do not wish the European elections to be transformed into a referendum on French domestic policy. The European elections have a very specific purpose, which is the election by universal suffrage of the members of the European parliament. In the present European crisis, strengthening the European parliament as a component institution of the Community seems to me an important element, and that strengthening is itself due to the fact that the parliament's members are henceforth to be elected by universal suffrage. It would be desirable, then, that these European elections not be diverted from their purpose, that they not be transformed into polemics among Frenchmen on other questions, and that the debate should in-

deed be on Europe--for God knows there is enough matter for debate at present on European problems. But having expressed that wish, I do not harbor many illusions: it is quite clear the opposition will seek to make of these elections not a plebiscite--that would be saying too much--but at least a test, for it is making no secret of it.

[Question] But if the opposition attacks you during the election campaign, on domestic policy, will you not be forced to react?

[Answer] The majority will define the debate in European terms: all the more so since the calendar is such that the European elections will be held during France's term in the presidency of the European Community. As he has said, President Mitterrand intends during that presidency to take a number of initiatives to try to breathe new life into the European Community, which is badly in need of it. So those initiatives will be the grounds on which the government can be judged, and the majority with it. We Socialists, then, will strive to make good use of the election campaign to show Frenchmen what is at stake in the European future and is also of first importance for the future of our own country. But it goes without saying that if the opposition wants to carry the debate to other grounds, beyond this debate which we consider essential, then the majority will respond to it.

[Question] How many slates will there be on the majority side, and who will head that of the Socialists?

[Answer] There will necessarily be two slates; and I think it normal that in an election by proportional representation--the only form of voting in which each political group can be quite precisely counted--each major political group should offer its own slate. In any case, that is how the Left will act. As to who will head the Socialist slate, that decision has not yet been made. The man who seems best qualified to head the slate, in the eyes of the majority of Socialist militants, is the party's first secretary Lionel Jospin. We thought it best, however, to allow ourselves a certain time to reflect on the conduct and composition of the slate, as well as on the final draft of the manifesto which is to serve as the basis for the PS election campaign. That is why the deadlines set in January have been deferred.

[Question] For how long?

[Answer] It cannot be for more than a few weeks. All steps must be completed by March at the latest.

[Question] As you were saying, France has presided the European Community since 1 January. How will the French government go about attempting a political revival which according to President Mitterrand would make possible the assertion of a European will?

[Answer] The word "will" is essential. The European Community has reached a stage of grave crisis, which the Athens summit revealed, because it lacks

precisely that political will. Of course, there are complex technical problems--milk surpluses, compensatory totals--but a solution can be found for every one of them, provided the Ten have the collective political will to solve them, and thereby create the conditions for a new start. Before the Athens summit a number of bilateral political or technical meetings had made it possible to take some rather big steps. An example is the problem of compensatory totals: the Ten have always wished for an agreement between France and Germany which could be the basis for a general agreement. Now, as between France and Germany, that agreement has practically been reached. But the Athens summit did not give concrete form to that agreement, for it supposed actual agreement to exist on everything else, and the summit could only conclude by an overall agreement. In itself, the problem of compensatory totals can be settled, and it is practically settled between France and Germany and so, practically, among the Ten, but on condition all other problems be likewise settled. There still must be an overall will to reach agreement. This means for everyone to consent, at a given time, to make concessions to another, for each to forget his particular interests, and that by laying everything on the table a sum of concessions would be made permitting general agreement. For that one must believe in Europe and in the need for the European Community, and until now that is what has been most lacking. So Francois Mitterrand's intention is to examine anew, by means of bilateral meetings prior to any further summit, the possibilities of agreement on each pending question; and from that starting point to launch a number of initiatives which could restore to the Ten their taste for working together. That is quite important. In a number of fields, Europe is today is considerably weakened, and has lost ground to such economic giants as the United States and Japan, simply because it has no common policy. There is barely time to save Europe from that decline, which would be altogether tragic.

[Question] Is France in the best position to succeed in that?

[Answer] It happens that France is presiding over the Community for the next 6 months, by the chance of the calendar. That is a short time in which to emerge from the crisis, but I think the favorable factor is that Francois Mitterrand is a convinced European; he has always been so, and is convinced there can be no future for any of the Community's member states unless they pool their futures. So during these 6 months the President can contribute to bringing our partners to an understanding that the time has come to cease quarreling over secondary matters which relegate to the background Europe's fortunes in the great world competition.

[Question] Does enlargement to include Spain and Portugal--two countries now knocking at the door--constitute another problem for Europe?

[Answer] I will say that the problem of enlargement, which is a complex one, enters into that same concern: the matter of a political will. The problem is particularly that of Spain. Its entry into the Common Market will certainly have special consequences for some regions of France like

Languedoc-Roussillon. But we cannot honorably prolong the present situation of the Community vis-a-vis Spain, which has returned to democracy after 40 years of dictatorship, and has been knocking at Europe's door for 6 years. And for 6 years we have made no response, except to say: politically we agree, but economically there are great obstacles. We must say yes or no to Spain, but we must answer. Here also, I think the French presidency may be the means of moving ahead.

Question Apart from the Communists, who are always very reticent towards Europe, do you not think that at the very heart of the PS, and particularly of CERES certain elements are impeding the determination of the government and President to build Europe?

Answer I think that problem has been left behind. In the PS, which is a party of diverse makeup, there are differences of sensitivity to European questions. There are people who have always been committed to the building of Europe, like Francois Mitterrand and a great majority of Socialists; and there are those who have been more reticent, and to whom the weakness of the European Community has given arguments. But I do not think that constitutes today a great debate within the PS. It seems to me all Socialists will agree first to conduct a firm, active and dynamic campaign for the forthcoming elections to the European parliament; and secondly to support the government and President in the initiatives they may take to create new fields of action for the European Community. Regarding the Communists' position, which is very reticent, I do not believe they are opposed to those initiatives, especially if they make it possible to reinvigorate industrial and social policies.

Question In that regard, can the PC-PS majority continue displaying its differences over international problems?

Answer That question was given a lengthy airing at the time of the two-party summit. It is quite normal that two parties which are different by nature should react differently to a number of international problems. On the other hand, what is important is that the groups which belong to the governmental majority and which take part in government should be united in support of the policy adopted by the government and more particularly, in foreign affairs, by the President. Georges Marchais has said and repeated that few things set him apart from the President's policy. One of them is important, for it concerns including French nuclear forces in American-Soviet negotiations. But that question is now less current since those negotiations are unfortunately broken off. But it could become so again. For the rest, and particularly Lebanon, it is true that the PC has rather emphatically taken a position favoring a certain disengagement by France and an appeal to the UN. But that is not a wide divergence: the French government and the PS are fully agreed the UN should further commit itself in Lebanon so that we can some day attain some manner of relief of the multinational force by a UN force. But what Georges Marchais and the PC then forgot to say is that if the UN was never able to act on the Lebanese question it was because there had always been a Soviet veto in the Security

Council. That Soviet veto was lifted a few weeks ago since the Security Council was able to vote unanimously for a Tripoli cease-fire resolution.

That is one way for the UN to resume its role in the Lebanese question, and we take satisfaction in it.

Question Do you not think France's position is weakened, despite Francois Mitterrand's efforts, by the country's economic situation?

Answer That is the leitmotiv of the opposition! I do not think so at all. First, France's economic position is far from being as bad as the Right pretends. It has strong points and weak points. But on the whole, in relation to most neighboring countries, France compares well. For two and a half years, with the voice of Francois Mitterrand, France has taken in foreign policy--in the Middle East, in East-West relations, and vis-a-vis the Third World--far reaching positions and initiatives. And one needs only travel a bit to note the image of France is today much better esteemed than it was in the preceding presidential term.

6145

CSO: 3519/161

KKE CENTRAL COMMITTEE ON PASOK COOPERATION

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 4 Jan 84 p 1

[Text] "A democratic government" resting also on the KKE, which it calls "a solution of national necessity," is being proposed yet again by the Communist Party, in the resolution of the KKE Central Committee which was made public yesterday.

The KKE resolution maintains that "despite its opposition to the general direction of governmental policy on the great issues of Change, and within this opposition, it is seeking cooperation on an equal basis with PASOK on specific questions of the safeguarding of peace, the repudiation of imperialist pressures and the exclusion of the Right, the expediting of democratic reforms, and dealing with the problems of the working class."

As political observers point out, these aims of the KKE corroborate the continuous broadening of cooperation between the two parties and the "moratorium" in their relations, which has helped the government to pursue an unquestionably unsuccessful economic policy.

The resolution observes further that dialogue and this cooperation with PASOK can help the unity of the people to grow stronger, the reasonableness of cooperation among the progressive forces to gain ground, the practice of hegemonism and total control to subside, and the country's political life to shift towards more progressive directions.

The Euro-elections

In the coming 5 months the party must wage the difficult and important battle of the European Parliament elections, the results of which will exert an important influence on subsequent domestic political developments.

The chief focus of the election-campaign work of the party is the fight against the given consequences of our accession to the EEC, on the way towards the disengagement of our country from this. The party addresses itself not only to all those who are in favor of this disengagement from the Common Market, but also to all those who are seeking a consistent pleading for their interests within the framework of the EEC.

The party must persuade broader masses of the Greek people that backing it also in the European Parliament elections is the best means of pressuring the government to deal with the problems of the people.

Furthermore, the KKE is clearly using temperate tones in characterizing as inconsistent the foreign policy of the government, which it does not consider to be "independent." And this because this policy is defined by governmental undertakings and intentions aimed at avoiding a break with the imperialists, and so "it timidly proceeds to make accommodations with them."

12114

CSO: 3521/141

ND PERCEIVES GROWING PASOK-KKE COOPERATION

Averof Foresees Head-on Confrontation

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 6 Jan 84 pp 1, 3

[Article by Andrea Zoula]

[Text] The New Democracy Party now perceives clearly that it will be forced into a head-on confrontation with PASOK and the KKE, given that these two parties are constantly broadening their cooperation and are creating prospects for a post-election collaboration in case Papandreou's party is deprived of its parliamentary control. This is evident from yesterday's statement by Evang. Averof, who identifies as indicative of the intentions of the two parties the KKE's findings concerning "a dangerous advancement by the Right on a nation-wide scale," the appeal by the extreme Left for equal participation in the government, and finally the "moratorium" which PASOK has assented to in the exercising of power. In light of these things, the statement by the leader of the official opposition is also regarded as definitive for the line which the ND intends to adopt, with it responding to its two adversaries "not as co-advocates of the socialist transformation, but as parties jointly accountable for the government's failure."

The statement by Averof is as follows:

"PASOK has received an answer many times to its unsufferable babblings and excessive praising of itself about its strength as well as to its comic claims about the present strength of the New Democracy Party, from elections in associations, organizations, and undergraduate and student communities.

"The other day it received this answer once again, from its loyal ally the KKE, in authoritative written statements from the plenum of the party and from its party organization in northern Greece. In these statements the KKE notes the 'dangerous advancement by the ND on a nation-wide scale.'

"With these findings, which are addressed above all to PASOK, the KKE gives 'timely advice' about strengthening their alliance, which has been informal up to now, and about continuing on a 'common course.'

"It does not content itself with the trade-offs made up to now. It asks for more, and according to these texts it seems that it is asking for participation in the government. Because how else can its position be interpreted that 'what is needed is a democratic government based on all the progressive forces and on the working-class movement'?"

But no matter what PASOK and the KKE are planning to do, in no way can they stop the upward course of the New Democracy Party, because at last it has become common knowledge among the Greek people that this party is the only guarantee of genuine democracy, progress, and prosperity."

The Positions of the Parties

Political observers note that the positions which are expressed in the statement by the ND chairman take on special significance in view of the "political milestone" of June. And this is true regardless of whether only the Euro-elections are held on that month, or whether at the same time the decisive showdown will be brought about also through moving up the date of the parliamentary elections as well.

It is considered certain that the tactics which PASOK will follow during the election-campaign period for the Euro-elections will be based on a general position which, even though it will refer to the specific electoral confrontation, will "function" at the same time also as a chief focus of election-campaign activity for the--very likely--contingency of conducting early parliamentary elections along with the Euro-elections.

PASOK's Election-campaign Positions

Despite the fact that for objective reasons the opportunities for PASOK to engage in major pre-election maneuvers have decreased (commitments made, controversy over the benefits to the country from its accession to the EEC, or even a sudden heightening of anti-Western sentiment in the ill-fated event of embroilment in the Cyprus question), it seems that the ND has not ruled them out. In any case, it believes that during the election-campaign period the steps taken by PASOK will most likely be based above all:

1. On a policy of "cautious" financial handouts within the framework of the announced "relaxed" income policy, although even this is tending to go beyond the limits of the economy.
2. On the political exploitation to the greatest possible extent of the contrast between PASOK and the ND, and exploiting the relations between PASOK and the KKE.

As for the confrontation between the government and the official opposition, the general opinion prevailing in the ND is that the slogan "No to the Right" will be the main focus used by PASOK to develop its election-campaign tactics and sloganeering. This impression is supported by the assessment that the false contrast with which PASOK has been charging its relations and its political dialogue with the ND for a long time now has been elevated into the main element of differentiation between the

country's two large parties. And this contrast is made sharper as the exercise of governmental power and the responsibilities which this entails have dictated many important revisions of PASOK's basic proclamations. Revisions and reorientations which have taken PASOK's administrative practice very far from the founding declarations of the movement and very close to the positions of the ND.

Need for Cohesion

It is believed further that the slogan "No to the Right" is also addressed to those within PASOK itself, for the purpose of enjoining as a self-evident duty the rallying of all the members of the movement around the leading group, and of forestalling the creation of any other movement which might surface within the camp of the governing party. Such a movement would have a very adverse effect on the electorate in surfacing at the politically very sensitive time of the pre-election period and in being focused on the ideological purity of PASOK.

PASOK is already facing the harsh criticism of the Panagoulis and Kargopoulos groups, which consist of ousted PASOK officers. And in its opinion this criticism can have adverse consequences for it, regardless of whether these consequences add up to political benefits for these two groups, or simply will mean a political loss for PASOK.

The Attitude of the KKE

It seems that for its part the KKE will continue to go easy on the government for however long the simultaneous conducting of the Euro-elections and early parliamentary elections is considered very likely. The KKE will toughen its attitude toward the government for a time, according to the assessments of political observers, only if the possibility of a double electoral process is eliminated. If merely the Euro-elections are ultimately held next June, it is obvious that the KKE will strive to capture the bulk of PASOK's dissatisfied leftist voters. And it is pointed out that an impressive advancement by the KKE in the Euro-elections of June will carry a decisive weight in the further development of relations between PASOK and the KKE for the following parliamentary elections.

But as things now stand, it is considered certain that the KKE will continue to go easy on the government, while striving for two major party objectives:

1. The KKE is keenly concerned that the government--in which it itself certainly does not participate--formulates those of its positions known as "singular," which diverge from the Western positions and draw near to if not coincide with the Moscow line, in the offered rostrums of the international organizations to which the country belongs, and above all in NATO and the EEC.
2. Under the PASOK government, the KKE has managed to acquire an informal but very substantial influence--which is disproportionate to its electoral strength--over the shaping of the country's policy.

Revision of Objectives

The KKE is openly--in proclamations made repeatedly--placing these two major party objectives ahead of the traditional objectives which it used to give priority to under ND governments. The KKE now understands that its battle for its traditional objectives has flagged terribly. Just a few days ago the resolution of the recent plenum of the KKE Central Committee was made public. In this, the following official excuse for the limited successes in the battles of the working class during 1983 appears:

"The pressure of mass unemployment, the wait-and-see sentiments, and the practice of restraining these struggles which the faction of the governing party is following, as well as certain deficiencies in the trade-union movement, have not allowed the struggles to reach an even higher level aimed at safeguarding the income of the workers and at pushing forward changes of an institutional and structural character in an anti-monopolistic democratic direction."

It is obvious, as an eminent ND officer stressed, that these arguments constitute the chief grounds for an "intensification of the fight" and not reasons which explain its curbing. And the fact that these views appear in a resolution by the KKE Central Committee is believed to indicate that the tactics of going easy on PASOK are being given legitimacy by the party and are long-range in scope (with the proviso that the Euro-elections and parliamentary elections are held simultaneously).

It is emphasized that whereas the peculiar "moratorium" in the relations between PASOK and the KKE does not have direct political ramifications (in the sense of creating new forms of government), it does have the effect of a general acceptance of the government's measures by the official representation of the trade-union movement, to the degree that this is under the control of these two parties. But of much greater significance, it is believed, is the illusion which is thereby cultivated indirectly at a level of society much broader than the trade-union level that the non-existence of an organized contrary stand means also that the society approves of the government's job.

Many of its officers argue that the great challenge for the New Democracy is not merely to try to make its mark as the top party in the coming Euro-elections, but also a) to restore the political dialogue, b) to persuade the majority of the electorate that the commanded approval given by the labor-union movement under the control of PASOK and the KKE is not a proof of the effectiveness of the government's policy. And, it is pointed out, the party of the official opposition has a chance of success in this direction only if it engages in more forceful oppositionist criticism.

Government's Vague Reply to Charges

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 8-9 Jan 84 pp 1, 9

[Text] The government is going along with the indulgent attitude of the KKE within the framework of the peculiar "moratorium" in the relations

between PASOK and the KKE, while refusing to clarify its intentions concerning the possibility of future cooperation between the two parties. Characteristic of the government's tactics, political observers noted, is the fact that aside from a manifestly ambiguous statement the day before yesterday, the government has avoided responding either to yesterday's announcement by the New Democracy Party, in which the premier is called upon to "plainly clarify his position," or to a statement by Kh. Florakis, who reiterates the position of the KKE about cooperation with the government.

More specifically, with its announcement yesterday the official opposition emphasizes that "the closer cooperation" between PASOK and the KKE which has been hatched up a) gives proof of the weakness of these two parties, and b) cannot stop the ND's course on the way to assuming power. And the secretary general of the KKE is emphasizing, among other things, that "the cooperation of the progressive forces is a national necessity and the only democratic alternative on the road to genuine change."

The sole reaction by the government to the issue of the "moratorium" between PASOK and the KKE was the statement the day before yesterday by the government representative (a response to the statement given by the chairman of the ND, E. Averof, last Thursday). With this statement, the government takes an only indirect position on the issue (making assurances that PASOK will implement "its own" program). And its extremely low-key reaction (Florakis believes that a single-party administration made up of PASOK alone is not a democratic alternative) is interpreted as an effort to avoid a rift with the KKE. In any case, this is what is pointed out also by the ND in its announcement the day before yesterday in response to the statements of the government representative.

It is pointed out in addition that a government source who was asked yesterday if the government would be responding to the statement by Florakis referred to the statement by its representative made the day before yesterday.

The ND Announcement

In response to the statement by the secretary general of the KKE, Khar. Florakis (which is being published later on), the following declaration was issued yesterday by the New Democracy Party:

"Mr Florakis has hastened to show his cards. In a crude and cynical fashion, he has called his party and PASOK the only "democratic forces" in the country and has characterized their cooperation as a national necessity, as the only democratic alternative, and as a firm policy of the KKE.

"His remarks at last reveal the closer cooperation between the two arms of the extreme Left now being hatched up.

"This revelation is especially useful to the Greek people. Because it proves that these two feel so weak that they want to unite their forces.

"But under whatever terms it is achieved, this cooperation cannot stop the New Democracy's progress toward taking power. Because the Greek people have already suffered the hardships of a PASOK administration having the de facto support of the KKE. They have two periods to judge: A great advance which was seen under the New Democracy, and a different time of regression and privation which they suffered in the PASOK period.

"And for another reason as well the Greek people are not going to be swayed from their political choice for the New Democracy. Because they know who is speaking about the rallying of the 'democratic forces' and for what purpose it is doing this. Because they know who took up arms, murdered, and set fires throughout the country in order to suppress democracy, who were onlookers to this great tragedy at a safe distance, and who on the other hand defended democracy, saved it, and later upon the ruins and the graves created a Greece equal in standing with the countries of West Europe.

"Given these experiences, the Greek people cannot accept an alliance of two such partners: One which did harm to the country, and another which was simply a spectator of its hardships. They cannot accept a government in which the KKE will take part.

"The fact that PASOK has come to such a point as to need and accept the support of the KKE is truly sad.

"If its chairman has a differing opinion on all these things, he ought to plainly clarify his position. He is obliged to do this."

The Government

The government representative responded only yesterday to the statement made the day before yesterday by the chairman of the ND, E. Averof, with the following statement:

"The PASOK government is the great choice of the overwhelming majority of our people for the sake of a new course for our country in the direction of the great Change.

"Faithful to the popular mandate, PASOK will implement its program, the program which it itself proclaimed and which the Greek people voted for.

"As for Averof, it is truly sad for him to resort, as he stated, to 'authoritative texts' of another party, in seeking a life-jacket for the New Democracy Party."

Response

The ND responded to yesterday's statement by the government representative with the following announcement:

"After a delay of 24 hours, PASOK is trying to minimize the sensation created by the remarks of the ND chairman about closer cooperation between

the government and the KKE. And in order to cover itself it mentions the 48 percent of the votes which it captured in the elections by misleading the Greek people. But nobody disputes this. That which a great many of its followers are wondering is what can it capture today, and to what alliances is it turning in order to avoid foundering.

"It is quite clear that in its announcement today PASOK is trying--with extremely careful wording--on the one hand to avoid cutting off its bridges with the KKE, and on the other hand to reassure those of its officers and followers who do not want this cooperation.

"The chairman of the ND did not speak about this cooperation, he simply noted it. He spoke of texts whose substance and authenticity are confirmed just today by the KKE's news organ. And it may be difficult for a person to question the weight of such a testimony (the advancement of the ND, the need for cooperation among the 'democratic forces,' a unified policy, increased political role of the KKE), which does not come from the "accursed Right" but from the extreme Left, which is dear to PASOK.

"As for the rest, it has become common knowledge among the Greek people that the ND, which is on its way toward assuming power, does not need a life-jacket. It is PASOK which needs a life-jacket, and it itself has understood this. This is why it is sending a distress signal to its allies, in the hope that they can save it."

The KKE

The secretary general of the communist party, Khar. Florakis, became involved in the issue of PASOK-KKE relations, making the following statement yesterday:

"The howls and scare talk by the New Democracy and a portion of the press being heard these days in response to the resolution of the KKE Central Committee are quite familiar, and their purposes are also well known.

"The Right is afraid of the possibility of cooperation by the progressive forces. It and the variously titled publications associated with it understand better than anyone else that if there is successful cooperation among the progressive forces, the Right is never again going to see a parliamentary majority or its own administration. This is a firm political position of the KKE. And we repeat that the implementation right now of this position on cooperation among the progressive forces is a national necessity and the sole democratic alternative on the road to genuine change.

"As for the things concerning an increase in the strength of the New Democracy which supposedly the KKE asserts also, these are cheap fabrications. But they are understandable. Because 'the hungry person dreams of bread loaves.'"

POSSIBLE GOVERNMENT RESHUFFLE IN 1984

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 4-5 Dec 83 pp 1, 3

/Article by Nikos Nikolaou/

/Text/ The summit meeting of the Ten that starts today at Zappeio is surely the summit but also the last act of the Greek presidency that terminates a phase of our international relations that despite the known "peculiarities" basically was characterized by an effort to sail together, even though it was a hesitant effort, with our European colleagues. From Tuesday when the work of the meeting will be over and especially from the end of the month when France succeeds us in the presidency, the foreign economic relations of the country will go through a period of uncertainty and instability with an uncertain attitude by our country within the community framework.

The economic observers believe that with the Euro-elections of June 1984 as a landmark, the first six month period of the coming year will be marked by intense intra-party but also intra-government maneuverings and confrontations between the two lines that are grappling in PASOK regarding our tactics with the Community.

Undoubtedly these contrasts are becoming more acute in view of the reshuffle of the government that may occur before the holidays. Already there is information that the minister of Agriculture, Mr K. Simitis, one of the most productive during the period of the presidency, is losing his position. According to the same information, Mr Papandreou asked Mr Simitis the day before yesterday to place his name on the top of the ballot for Euro-Parliament Members of PASOK. In this clever manner, a power with which the hard liners of the party never compromised is beheaded.

On the other side, however, the return to the government of former minister of Coordination, Mr Ap. Lazaris, who will take a number of responsibilities (programming etc.) that belong to Mr Arsenis at the present time, seems more possible than ever. The latter's position is being weakened methodically. Already the prime minister has notified him that he is discussing the replacement of every bank manager, except for Mr Panagopoulos. This way, if a scapegoat is needed, his exit will be as painless as possible.

There is no Question of Leaving

Regardless of how the power struggle in the government comes out after the reshuffle, however, the sure thing is that there will be no dramatic developments because it is certain that without the financial support of the Community, the Greek economy could not survive the pressures of the balance of payments.

Besides, the recent Cypriot crisis underlined as never before the significance of our joining as a diplomatic support in our clash with Turkey. It is, however, beyond question that while at this time there is no possibility of Greece leaving the EEC, the predominance in the government of a pro-Community or anti-Community line will influence directly the financial developments in our country and to a certain degree the political developments as well.

A Fragile Balance

During the struggle between the two lines in the six month period of the presidency that is over at the end of the month, there was an unstable and fragile balance that was imposed from above. Appreciating the international prestige that the presidency could give his government, Mr Andr. G. Papandreou did not give the green light to either side.

Now it is known that the presidency did not provide as much as had been expected. The Greek presidency performed its duties correctly, but without enthusiasm. The initiatives were restricted to financial matters, ignoring that without the political unity of the European nations a financial incorporation is not possible.

This underestimation and disdain for the political aims of Europe hurt and weakened the Greek role. It was not accidental that the last trip of the prime minister to five European capitals had poor results. In any case, it did not justify the unifying and synthetic role in the differences of the companies that the presidency must play. While Mr Papandreou was seeing the French prime minister Mitterand last Wednesday, Chancellor Kohl on Friday, Mitterand and Kohl were meeting alone on Thursday and developed their positions regarding the community problems, without the intervention of the presidency.

With the exception of the positive participation of some Greek ministers (Simitis, Vaitzos, Varfis), the rest of our attitude supported the suspicion of many Europeans that our participation in the Community is exhausted in the perpetual withdrawal of funds from the Community treasuries.

The Clash

Starting the day after tomorrow, however, all the arguments concerning our relations with the EEC will surface with special acuteness, while the degree by which the financial situation will get worse will be blamed totally on the Community with great zeal by both the prime minister and the minister of National

Economy, Mr Ger. Arsenis.

As is known, the most critical problem of our economy at the present time is the big gap in the balance of payments that compels it to get increasingly bigger loans from abroad. And while all the countries of the Community show a significant progress in this sector, Greece in contrast gets worse. It is characteristic that the deficit as a percentage of the gross national product was .2% in 1981, rose to 3.8% in 1982, will be 5% this year and 5.5% in 1984. To the contrary all the countries of the Community are found to have a steady drop and the EEC as a whole is expected to drop the gap to nothing in 1984.

So it is said that as the shortage of the balance grows and as the difficulty of finding foreign loans will become torturing, so will Mr Arsenis and the party members of the Executive Office pressure Mr Papandreou toward some demagogic fireworks in our relations with the EEC, arguing at the same time that this will help the party in view of the Euroelections.

Pesmazoglou's Critique

The president of KODISO [Social Democratic Party], Mr I. Pesmazoglou, in his speech Wednesday to foreign correspondents was crushing in his arguments with which he refuted the government's claims concerning the alleged responsibility of the EEC in making the Greek economy worse and especially in the balance of payments. And he proved that the reason is indigenous not exogenous. The deterioration in the balance of payments of the country, he emphasized, is due mainly to the general reduction in productivity and competitiveness. And the decisive responsibility for this belongs to the government.

The economic observers point out the basically positive position some ministers of the government who are closely tied with the party are indicating toward the Community. It is characteristic that the Minister of Finance, Mr Giannis Pottakis, does not hide his marxist approach to many subjects while pointing out the problems created by joining the Community, but does not hesitate to confess the real reasons for these problems when he writes in the introductory report of the budget that: "The low productivity of industry, at about half the productivity of the industry of the Community, the high rate of inflation, twice that of the average inflation in the Community, the low quality of our products and the lack of the necessary substructure result in curbing their competitiveness and the danger of losing the internal market to the Community products".

So this way, the position of third world ministers that want to push towards a clash with the Community is really very weak and only Mr Papandreou's weakness in confronting the increased acuteness of the problems could get them out of their impasse.

However, the positive stand the Community maintains up to now regarding the memorandum is one more reason to discourage the anti-community people. The agreement for the regulative tax import, the postponment in the import of the tax for added

value and the recognition of the deviation from the regulations for government supplies in principle are significant gestures, while on the other hand, the committee has proceeded toward solutions for the other Greek requests also, the approval of which depends on the political will of the Ministerial Council at this point.

Tripled Inflation

Of course there is the request for extending the restrictions that the Ministry of Trade imposed on the import of certain Community products for another six months that apparently has been denied categorically by the committee. But it cannot be exploited demagogically since more and more levels of the Greek people understand that the deterioration of the economic situation is due to the economic policy of the government and not to the EEC.

Of the 10 countries of the Community, only Greece exercises such a fickle and contradictory economic policy that results in three times as much inflation as the average in the EEC, 21.3% in September as opposed to 7.4%.

In all the European countries, socialist or not, the public deficits are restricted and the private sector is supported to increase production and exports. In Greece, as indicated by the budget, the shortages increase while private businesses, one after another, are pushed to bankruptcy and are taken over by the government. With the socialization of the damages, however, the need to resort to an oppressive overtaxation of the wage earners is inevitable.

9346

CSO: 3521/115

DECLARATION FROM THE PANHELLENIC CONGRESS

Athens I AVGI in Greek 6 Dec 83 pp 1, 7

/Text/ For a Party of the Masses, a Democratic Party, a Productive Party.

The full text of the declaration voted for by the Panhellenic Organizational Congress (25-27 November) of the KKE Interior follows:

The revolution of our century, the technological one, has changed the circumstances of our era, since it is accompanied by a radical change in the technology of war.

Today humanity lives in a great contrast: the economic and social crisis, unemployment, hunger, the phenomena of poverty, the rapid destruction of the environment, everything that is "offered" by modern capitalism, can stop being a way of daily life for billions of people.

Instead of solving these problems that are vital to the existence of the world, humanity is being pushed to complete destruction through the insane nuclear armament race that is inflamed by US imperialism and is cultivated by the logic of bi-polarization.

The vision of a new society and a democratic order of things in international relations is more current than ever before. Socialism that has the basic characteristics of democracy, freedom, self rule, the respect of equality in the relations among peoples, remains the hope of humanity, even when the visions are tarnished by the practices and the concepts that are applied by the countries of "existing socialism" and increase their impasses.

The KKE Interior always has declared that the way out can be found only with the steady support of peace and the democratic gains of the workers and the people, with the incessant broadening of democracy and the participation of the masses that opens the way for a new organization of social and international relations.

Perspective for our Country

Greece is confronted with a double provocation. Greece is engaged in a double battle: to get out of the crisis, to overcome the delay, to enter the area of technological development and to achieve an incessant broadening of democracy and of its independence.

It requires a revolution in the field of production, in production relations, in the social and government structures, a revolution in the concepts for broadening the democracy, for the relationship of the workers with the authorities, for independence, for the role of Greece in building a unified Europe of the workers.

The Battle can be Won

The class struggle in our country will be affected crucially by the results of this battle. The forces of dependence and delay are slowing every effort toward a positive way out.

These forces are not very powerful. Lined up across from them are the social and political forces that will play a significant role on where our country will be going in the years to come.

The democratic and progressive parties, the mass movements and the social critique movements are summoned today and can play their role as subjects of a hopeful revolutionary procedure for changing society.

The Assembly of the Forces of Change

Within this perspective, we see the line of the KKE Interior in daily life being justified.

Its presence in the political life of the country inspires and keeps vigilant the conscience of those forces that can play a catalytic role for a new course for our country by cooperating and assembling.

Its philosophy and practice supporting democracy, popular participation and the development of an autonomous mass movement are those elements that can break the "ghetto" that the line of the dogmatic KKE forces upon communists.

Its critical voice exposes the impasses and the limits of the policy and physiognomy of PASOK, its weakness in being responsible for popular unity and change.

The KKE Interior is struggling for a coalition of political and social forces that express and activate the majority of the people and can guarantee the success of this true revolution that our country needs.

The KKE Interior is the party that with its practice, not only with declarations, can be convincing about the necessity of a closer equal cooperation with the socialists and communists of renewal, like a nucleus of a wider assembly of democratic forces.

The Need to Reinforce and KKE Interior

That is why we could say, without arrogance, and now convince that the KKE Interior is not only an expression of the effort to renew the Greek communist movement, but also of the willingness and the need to renew Greek society itself to open new roads for our country.

The fighters of the KKE Interior that blaze their trail in Greek reality through so many difficulties are the pioneering part of the labor class and of Greek society.

The reinforcement of the KKE Interior and its role is a condition for the victory of the revolution of modernization for achieving the renewal and the hope of socialism in our country.

A Party of the Masses, a Democratic Party, a Productive Party

A party with such a mission has to be a party of the masses, both in size and in its ties with the people and the workers. It must have a rich internal democratic life and a democratic relationship with the mass movements. It must be effective in its action to convince that it can play its role.

That is the way we want our party and that is what we are fighting to make it every day.

That is why we deny monolithicism, bureaucratic distortion, the imposition of the hierarchy, the isolation of the base.

That is why we reject nihilism or the downgrading of the role of the party as a guiding force in the class struggle and marxism as a source of inspiration and ideological orientation.

That is why we fight for guaranteeing the widest circulation of ideas for a substantial democratic life in our organizations, for the participation of the members in developing the political line, for the incessant two way communication between guidance and the base.

This way we can guarantee the largest and more substantial effectiveness as a party of action and not as an ideological heresy.

Lively and always New Structures and Operations

Our roots begin from the first struggles of the workers to gain their rights and to develop a conscience for their mission. The source of our inspiration is the best experiences of the labor and popular movement.

Starting from the rich and unrepeatable historical experience, we are searching for the proper forms of structure and operation under the present circumstances. Those experiences that will keep the revolutionary flame of our ideas and ideals in the party alive, enriched and strengthened, without destroying the popular initiative and spreading it to all the fronts where the people are fighting to take their fate into their own hands and change their life by changing society itself.

We want to be everywhere, in the neighborhood, in the village, in the factory, in the popular meeting, in the strike, in the demonstration, with powerful and effective organizations, so that we may act as a unified total, gaining that policy in all of the critical problems that reflects the widest consent of the party forces and guarantees substantial unity and inspired action.

We want the struggle of ideas free and open to the judgement of the members and of the people with a democratic spirit and democratic rules. Without polarizations, vertical comparisons, gang formations. So that we may all control and be controlled equally, without restrictions, to convince and, most of all, to be convinced with the ascertainment of the truth and the rejection of error within our collective experience.

For the Victory of our Ideas and Line

The fighting presence of the KKE Interior in all the critical fronts and the struggle for the victory of its line in all directions points the way to common action and a wider democratic unity, lights up the specific Greek conditions, convinces the masses, exercises its pressure on other forces and calls together a fighting assembly for common targets.

The party is struggling for the victory of this line and the EKON /Greek Communist Youth/ "Rigas Feraios", because this line can develop new dynamics in the blocked course of allagi, changing the present correlatives.

We are not alone in this struggle of ours. Old and new fighters, outside of our lines, are watching and judging our work. They are heading in the same direction and are inspired by the same visions.

We are inviting them to join our party, to strengthen it, to make its voice louder and enhance its fighting presence.

We are inviting them to join with us in finding forms of common struggle that will use their potential and fighting will next to our party, with the KKE Interior as the axis.

To spread the ideas of communist renewal, to strengthen and assemble the forces of renewal in Greek society, to renew the perspective of socialism in our country, to realize the vision of a new society that is socialist, free, democratic and self-governing.

9346

CSO: 3521/116

ND EFFORTS FOR PARTY MODERNIZATION

Athens TO VIMA TIS KYRIAKIS in Greek 27 Nov 83 p 2

/Article by Giannis Roubatis: "The 'Renewal' of the Right is More to the Right"

/Text/ Wearing the cape of the alleged Centrist, parliament members and officials of the "New Democracy" are trying to rejuvenate the worse hours of conservatism.

In the final analysis, are you what you say you are in Greece? This is true at least in the case of about 20 parliament members and three to four other officials of the New Democracy.

This refers to the self proclaimed "renewers" of the Right in Greece. During secret meetings and deliberations, they decided to present themselves as "saviors" who will lead us in the land of capitalistic prosperity.

Well, these devotees to the "right allagi" propose "solutions" to the problems of our times that, if put into effect, would return us to the beginning of our century. They propose an economic and social policy more reactionary than the conservative policy followed by the right itself during the last few decades. At the same time, with the systematic use of public relations methods, the parliament members and these officials of the New Democracy seek to present themselves as the "progressive wing".

As a "point of the spear" for the presentation of their positions, the "renewers" used first a former minister of the New Democracy who lost during the elections of November 1981, Mr Stefanos Manos.

Similarly, another former minister and a present New Democracy parliament member who also was the former substitute Minister of Coordination, Mr Giannis Palaio-krassas, also has presented "more carefully" the same views.

Finally, parliament member Mr Andreas Andrianopoulos, another former minister of the ND, is preparing to talk on Tuesday about the "worries" of the "renewer" group.

The common axis at the two public appearances of this group's representatives, at the speech of Mr Manos 20 days ago at the Intercontinental and at the speech of Mr Palaiokrassas a few days ago at the Hilton, was the theory of "neoliberalism".

These are the (reactionary) economic theories supported by the right wings of the conservative parties of the United States and England. With these theories that already are being applied in the two countries mentioned above, the complete dissolution of the welfare state is being attempted as well as the return to the unbridled liberalism of the 19th century.

In other words, the local "renewers" of the right are proposing the absolute freedom of the market, the absolute lack of government intervention and any control whatsoever.

Perhaps a typical example is the one that the "renewer" Mr Manos is supporting for "confronting the monster that is called the public sector".

"There is only one solution" according to the former minister of Industry Mr Manos "for the public enterprises and that is to get them out of the government". The "renewers", however, do not stop here. Mr Manos continued and explained how the "solution" he proposed would be effected.

"Getting them out of the government in most cases must be done with the free distribution of the capital of the public enterprises to the Greek taxpayers according to the degree of their participation in the income tax", said Mr Manos.

This "neoliberalistic" solution, however, would mean that enterprises such as DEI /Public Power Corporation/ and OTE /Greek Telecommunications Organization/ and the Public Petroleum Corporation and others that were established with the money of the Greek taxpayer would fall into the hands of about 2,000 Greeks who pay large taxes. This way, "popular capitalism" that the former minister of the ND spoke about would allow the large capital in Greece to exploit public utility organizations and transform them into monopolies of the large capitalists.

It is evident that the "renewers" and their neoliberalistic theories in the last analysis aim to take back what was gained by the large masses of Greeks after the struggles they made for many decades.

Something like this, this kind of purpose is not foreign. It has always been the right wing in Greece. That which calls attention is exactly that these positions of the official right who head the "movement" that are further to the right than ever before are attempted to be presented as a renewal, as allagi (change) of the Right.

This way, the alleged "centrists" of the ND are proven to be more rightist than the popularizing extreme rightists.

The end result is that finally even Mr E. Averof himself, as he was saying recently, cannot understand what the "renewers" want.

The presumptive "renewers" of the right first made their appearance almost immediately after the "psychological split" the New Democracy went through after the election of Mr Georgios Rallis as leader of the New Democracy.

The maneuvers that finally ended into the establishment of a formal group of "renewers" were speeded up after the electoral defeat of the Right during the 1981 elections, since a large number of parliament members were not reelected.

After the change in the leadership of the ND, certain "renewers" believed that the newly elected parliament members followed the "old party man", Mr Averof.

And it appears that some of them concluded that the road that would lead them to the leadership had closed.

At about this time, a new road was invented to the party leadership, the theory of neoliberalism.

Using the KPEE /Center for Political Research and Training/ that is financed by the Conrad Adenauer Foundation as a base of operations, first Mr Andreas Andrianopoulos and later others began to project the theories of Thatcher and Reagan.

At first the leadership of the ND was bothered by the activities of the neoliberals, but could not find a way to react.

Finally, according to those who are in a position to know, Mr Averof asked himself a simple question: Why are the Germans giving money to this Center? The answer was that the Germans were giving money because the ND, during talks it had with them, suggested the Center as a foundation that should be receiving money for the research it was conducting.

As soon as the German Foundation was notified by the new leadership of the ND, it stopped subsidizing the KPEE.

This did not thwart the "renewers" who almost immediately secured the money needed to operate the Center from rich Greeks and especially from industrialists.

About that time, certain parliament members of the ND with Messrs A. Andrianopoulos, V. Kondogiannopoulos, Anna Psarouda-Benaki and others first among them believed that by supporting Mr K. Stefanopoulos as the future ND leader, they could promote their positions.

During the same period, Mr K. Mitsotakis decided that the only area where he could find support was the one where the parliament members were faithful to Mr Averof. Mr Mitsotakis' position was literally desperate up until that time, because he did not manage to gather even the necessary five parliament members

so that he could also have become a candidate for the leadership of the ND during the intra-party elections of December 1981.

After the serious illness of Mr Averof, quite a few of the parliament members who supported him went to the "Mitsotakis camp".

Most of them, however, made it clear to Mr Mitsotakis that if Mr Averof returned to the leadership of the ND after his recuperation, they would return to him. That is what happened.

To the contrary, the "Stefanopoulos group" that had no problem in showing its "anti-Averofism", after spending a long time near Mr Stefanopoulos, realized that Mr Stefanopoulos rather did not have any hopes of climbing to the leadership of their party. So they gradually slipped away from his group.

During this period, five months ago, on the initiative of Messrs Andrianopoulos, Kondogiannopoulos and Panagiotopoulos, a movement is being established that has the fall of Mr Averof as its target as well as averting the election of Mr Mitsotakis. This movement does not have a leader, something that did not escape the attention of Mr Evert who thought it would be a good thing for him to participate in the group.

Shortly after joining, Mr Evert submitted the question of a leader for the group. A lot of discussions followed that did not end up anywhere. So it was decided not to elect an "unofficial" leader.

Then followed the publication in the periodical ENA with a "gallup poll" that claimed the ND did not have more than 17% of the vote.

This publication cheered the "renewer" group and gave them a new life. Because they believed that Mr Mitsotakis was behind this publication, the publisher of the periodical being his son-in-law, and theorized about the "new defection" of Mr Mitsotakis.

The meeting of the ND in Thessaloniki, however, killed the joy of this group. It is characteristic that immediately after the speech, important members of the "renewers" group such as Messrs Andrianopoulos and Manos hurried to congratulate Mr Averof in the halls of the Elektra Hotel.

The election is supplemented by what friends of Mr Averof mention about the leader of the ND knowing from the first moment everything about the secret meetings etc. of the "renewers" because certain members of the group immediately after every meeting would phone the leader of the ND to brief him on what happened!

ND YOUTH CONGRESS PLANS, PLATFORM

Athens MESIMVRINI in Greek 6 Dec 83 p 2

/Text/ The First Panhellenic Congress of the Working and Labor Union Officials of ONNED /Youth Organization of the New Democracy/ will take place this coming February and will be devoted to Peace and Friendship, Work and Social Justice, Democracy and Freedom.

This decision was announced the day before yesterday at a dinner meeting of the Working and Labor Union Officials of ONNED at the Kalyvas Club by the responsible official for Working Relations, Mr Khr. Ladias.

At the beginning of the meeting, Mr Ladias referred to the accomplishments and the purposes of the working ONNED.

An award ceremony followed for three members of the ONNED that contributed decisively to the production of organizational work in the Working Relations Section. The recipients were Messrs V. Mikhaloliakos, president of ONNED, Dim. Vasileiou, chief editor of the Bulletin of the Working ONNED and Aim. Athanasiou, responsible official for the Working Relations Section for Northern Greece.

Finally, Mr Ladias announced that the Working Relations Section decided to proclaim a panhellenic contest in memory of the assassinated publisher of VRADYNI, Gorgi Athanasiadis, awarding a prize of 10,000 drachmae to the young man or woman who would present the best written work on the subject: "A free and combative press is a must for Democracy and Freedom".

9346

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SDP VICTORY IN 1985 ELECTION SEEN DEPENDENT ON 'FUND' SUCCESS

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 3 Jan 84 p 6

[Commentary by Claes-Goran Kjellander]

[Text] For many people, there is now only one central issue in the political debate--the wage-earner funds.

Even during the election campaign, all of us whose job it is to listen to the messages of the various parties and experience the reactions in various political camps, understood perfectly well that the funds had a symbolic significance.

Even that little word "fund" provoked a reaction among hundreds, sometimes thousands, of people at campaign rallies. And it hardly needs to be pointed out who saw this word as positive and who saw it as negative.

Emotional Background

It is important to take the purely emotional background into account if we are to predict the significance of the fund issue in the 1985 campaign.

Of course, the parties can influence attitudes toward the wage-earner funds by more or less active and clever opinion-building, but basically the majority of citizens already have their own opinion, either positive or negative. Even among the majority of those in between probably hope that the funds will succeed or fail, depending on whether their heart is with the left or not.

On this background, it may be of interest to examine three theoretical cases, two of which are negative for the Social Democrats and one negative for the nonsocialist parties.

The threat to the nonsocialist parties is as follows.

The funds cause no major commotion before the 1985 elections. They purchase their stock, deliver the stipulated returns to the pension funds, and utilize their votes at various stockholder meetings. The boards are appointed without problems and the five fund administrators, who are recruited primarily from major union economists, manage their business transactions just as well as

their competitors and colleagues in the investment companies.

In this case, the nonsocialist parties must convince the voters that their original concept of the funds was correct. This could be a difficult task if the funds are inconspicuous and if the difference between the nonsocialists' warnings and reality is so great that the credibility of the nonsocialist parties is undermined.

Thus, the question that must be answered is as follows: How will present fund opponents react if, by the 1985 elections, the funds have not had the effects that have been predicted by fund opponents.

Shutdown First Touchstone

Assuming that personnel recruitment is accomplished without conflict, the first touchstone for the funds probably will be the shutdown or drastic reduction of some major plant.

Obviously, many will demand that the wage-earner funds step in, since much support for the funds was created by the promise that they could save jobs.

But the funds could not save a single job in this situation. According to the resolution approved by parliament, a fund can funnel capital into a company only in amounts corresponding to no more than 8 percent of the voting shares of that company.

Because of their money, the funds are a balancing factor on the market, but because of their legal structure, they are totally powerless when it comes to saving jobs through selective investments in small and medium-size companies. In addition, the funds cannot lend money, neither directly nor through banks. The only possibility they have is to make capital contributions to economic associations.

Reaction Of Fund Supporters

Thus, the question that must be answered is as follows: How will fund supporters react when they realize that the funds cannot affect layoffs?

The other question that may trouble the Social Democrats requires several assumptions: Assume that stock prices stagnate or drop during 1984, that inflation is somewhat higher than the government hopes, for example 7 percent, and finally that the dominant companies on the stock market, in order to avoid increased pressure on rising wages, hold dividends down.

Drain On Capital

If two of these conditions are met, the funds will be forced to draw on their capital from the very first year in order to deliver the level of profits to the pension funds as stipulated by law.

According to the parliamentary resolution, the returns should amount to inflation plus 3 percent. Thus, with an inflation rate of 7 percent each fund must deliver about 40 million kronor. Next year, assuming the same rate of inflation, the sum would increase to 80 million kronor. Even in the best possible case, the stock dividends would amount to only half this sum.

Thus, the question that must be answered is as follows: How will fund supporters react if the funds are forced to sell stock in order to meet the requirement of 3-percent real returns?

9336

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VPK LEADER DISCUSSES POLICY IN SUPPORT FOR PALME GOVERNMENT

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 30 Dec 83 p 7

/Article by Hans C Alfredsson: "Not a Reserve Company for the S"

/Text/ The VPK /Left Party Communists/ is not any automatic reserve company for the Social Democrats. During the autumn the government has had to obtain the support of a shifting majority for its proposals in the Riksdag.

Many observers believe that the VPK is trying to be tougher and tougher towards the Social Democrats. The VPK denies this. But it is pointed out that they want to make clear that it really is an independent party and not a trailer which always follows the Social Democrats when there is a final vote.

"The Social Democrats would be smart to realize that they do not have a majority by themselves," a key VPK figure states. "We really think that they could listen to us a little more."

The relationship to the Social Democrats was discussed this fall in a Riksdag debate on the youth law.

"Should Show Consideration"

He made "some reflections on how cooperation between the two labor parties in the Riksdag should take place:"

He said that the government can in all situations when its existence is threatened rely upon the VPK. The Social Democrats also "have our votes" in all matters when the government's proposal is judged to be better than the bourgeoisie's.

"There are matters in which there is no compromising. Those are obvious acts of solidarity.

"But," Jorn Svensson said, "there are situations where the VPK cannot follow the Social Democrats. Those situations should be resolved in a sensible manner. This could be achieved by the parties trying to take into consideration each others points of departure."

SPLITS AMONG NONSOCIALISTS DEEP DESPITE OPPOSITION TO FUND

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 30 Dec 83 p 6

/Commentary by Sven Svensson: "Falldin Refuses to Follow in Moderates' Leash"/

[Text] The political year 1983 ended with a grand common demonstration by the three non-labor parties against the Social Democrats' wage earner funds. In reality the differences of opinion among the non-labor parties are greater than in a long time. The Center Party is less and less disposed to follow the leadership of the Moderates.

Thorbjorn Falldin, the leader of the Center Party, said before the 1976 election that it is always better to have the Moderates in the government than on the outside.

Now Falldin is saying openly that the centerist government consisting of the Liberal Party and the Center Party was the government which functioned best during the non-labor six year interval.

As a matter of fact, it is almost an open secret that Falldin is demanding that the center be larger than the Moderates for it to be on the whole appropriate to form a new non-labor three-party government. Falldin would be in such a case the obvious candidate for prime minister.

Falldin is skeptical particularly in three areas in regard to the policies of the Moderates. These involved security policy and allocation questions.

Strong Criticism

Already just a couple of days before the 1982 election Falldin took a stand against the Moderates' more NATO-orientea security policy. Before the foreign newspaper correspondents in Sweden Falldin in answering a question disassociated himself from several aspects of the Moderates' security policy. By the evening of the election Falldin was strongly critical.

This fall Falldin pursued the line against the Moderates when they accused Prime Minister Olof Palme of giving double signals to the Soviet Union in the submarine affair. From the very beginning Falldin made clear that this accusation was unjustified.

A double message in the submarine affair would have meant that Palme would in part have lost his credibility in Moscow and in part lost face with domestic opinion in Sweden.

Falldin personally does not make any secret of the fact that he individually warned both Ulf Adelsohn and Carl Bildt against extracurricular activities in security policy. Falldin could hardly be in a position to acknowledge the leadership of the Moderates in Swedish security policy after what happened this fall.

The promises of the Moderates for tax reductions in combination with the savings policy is the other difficulty. Falldin's reasoning is that implementing the policy of the Moderates would lead to high unemployment, say about 10 percent undisguised unemployment.

Falldin does not think that the Center can accept such a development. It is all important that the people have work. A background to Falldin's very strong feelings in this question is that Olof Palme accused the centerist government of deliberately causing unemployment.

Falldin then personally became very much upset and has not forgiven Palme for that statement. It is clear that Falldin does not intend to give Palme the chance after the 1985 election to come back with justifiable criticism in this matter.

Falldin likes to use as an example of the controversies with the Moderates' allocation policies the Riksdag decision regarding individual fees for long-term illnesses.

The Moderates are fervent supporters of increased fees for sick care and emphasize that in their proposal for a new program. Initially they supported individual fees for health care but when opposition to the proposal got stormy, the moderates were the first to jump off, Falldin readily says in the conversation.

Falldin's conclusion is that the Moderates desire increased fees in the health care system in order to be able to lower taxes, but it is the basic fee which will be increased and no fees in relation to income will be instituted.

Increased basic fees in the health care system would have a distorted income-policy effect. It would hit the low income people but people with high pensions or other income would get off mildly. Falldin maintains that the Center Party can never accept such a development.

No Peace

The recently concluded three party demonstration against the wage earner funds has created the impression that all is peace and joy within the non-labor three-party block. On the contrary, the three-party demonstration had obvious cracks in the facade.

To the question as to whether the demonstration was the beginning of closer cooperation among the three parties, Falldin answered:

"It is obvious that there are differences among our parties. But as far as this question is concerned the voters now know that whichever way the non-socialist majority is divided, the funds will be dismantled, and that is worthwhile."

In plain language that means that in regard to the wage earner funds it is not important if the center is greater or less than the Moderates. The wage earner funds will be dismantled if there is a non-labor majority, and that's that.

But as to the rest Falldin has drawn a clear line. He will go back home to his village rather than subordinate himself to Adelson. That is a fact which stands out more and more clearly from the political messages which Falldin in various ways has left behind.

Start All Over Again

Since Falldin's goal is that the center shall be larger than the Moderates the two latest public opinion polls are like a cold shower. He had hoped for a continued increase for the center, especially the Liberals, at the cost of the Moderates. Instead the Moderates regained what they had lost in the earlier poll. Falldin now has to start over again next year.

He has the experience of the office of prime minister, and his doctrinal purity in security matters is beyond a shadow of a doubt in a situation where Sweden's position is becoming more and more precarious.

Everything points towards Adelson's and Falldin's fighting a duel during 1984 for the non-labor leadership with the goal of the best possible profile for the 1985 election. And there is no prospect for any coalition outside the bloc limits, however, much old red-green nostalgic people like Tage Erlander and Gunnar Hedlund plead the case.

The Liberal Party leader, Bengt Westerberg, who does not even have a seat in the Riksdag can hardly play any decisive role in the power struggle for a new non-labor government and its appearance. On the other hand, Westerberg must, if all the signs are not wrong, decide whether to bet on Adelson or Falldin as the winning horse in the non-labor duel.

FALLDIN COMMENTS ON SUBMARINE INCIDENTS, FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 13 Jan 84 p 7

[Article by Lars Christiansson]

[Text] "The Conservatives and the Social Democrats have let their desire to confront each other extend to foreign policy issues. I believe that our two largest parties would both profit from toning down the debate and, instead, concentrate on the issues and work for the good of Sweden."

This criticism was made by Center Party leader Thorbjorn Falldin in a speech delivered to the Foreign Policy Institute in Stockholm last Thursday.

"In the long run, parties that do not seek the best solutions cannot be trusted when it really counts, even though they attempt to sound cocky when there is no direct threat," the Center Party leader continued.

In his double-edged criticism, Falldin also said that the Conservatives had every reason in the world to try to avoid confrontation and separate solutions. Instead, they should work toward general acceptance for our foreign policy in all political camps.

Regarding the Social Democrats, Falldin said they should be extremely interested in actually demonstrating that they are the uniting force they say they are.

"It is possible for the parties to maintain their own profiles, while developing Swedish foreign and security policies in which continued unity is the fundamental goal."

Submarine Incursions

Falldin stated that the submarine incursions had continued. We do not really know if all the intruders are coming from the same country, i.e. the Soviet Union, Falldin said and continued:

"In principle, it does not matter. What must be pointed out is that the diplomatic reactions have been insufficient. Only when we are able and willing

to put military force behind our words will we ever be left alone."

Falldin pointed out that there was still unity among the parties on foreign policy issues, but that the Social Democrats and the Conservatives should lower their voices. They still would be able to express themselves clearly and precisely.

The Center Party leader said that the Social Democratic government sometimes gave the impression that it wanted to water down the military component of Sweden's security policy and try to compensate for this through political means. At the same time, the Center Party leader expressed his satisfaction with the Social Democratic government's initiative toward negotiations on carrying out the defense resolution of 1982.

"Confusing"

"I believe that this was smart of the Social Democrats. But it is a bit confusing when a party attempts to satisfy two different opinions, one by its propaganda and another by its actions."

The Center Party leader also criticized the government for its handling of the proposal for a nuclear-free corridor.

Foreign Minister Lennart Bodstrom was criticized for his statements on the nuclear-free zone in the Nordic countries. But Falldin also emphasized that there was general agreement among the parties on Prime Minister Palme's policy on the Nordic zone issue.

Falldin also stated that the Stockholm Conference was being convened at a time when the superpowers' confidence in each other was practically nonexistent. Our own country has come closer and closer to the center of tension. This has been made especially clear to all Swedes by the submarine incursions.

The Center Party leader was not particularly optimistic about the prospects of the Stockholm Conference. The conference has a limited mandate. But this will not prevent it from making a significant contribution toward reducing tension if the political desire is present.

"If we are to be realistic, our expectations must be low. The worst that could happen would be for our expectations to rise and then not be met. This could lead to an extremely uncertain and, thus, serious international situation," said Falldin, who pointed out that the small gleam of hope for improved relations between the superpowers results from the fact that the foreign ministers of both the Soviet Union and the United States will be present at the opening of the Stockholm Conference.

9336
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BOOK VIEWS AFFECT OF NORDICS' SECURITY ON FINLAND

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 18 Dec 83 p 16

[Article by Jukka Tarkka: "The Real World of Nordic Policy"]

[Text] Rene Nyberg: "Pohjolan turvallisuus ja Suomi. Ydinaseiden vaheneva merkitys" [Nordic Security and Finland. The Diminishing Significance of Nuclear Weapons]. Kirjayhtymä Publishing House, 198.

The most important partial factor in Finland's security policy is its political sector. Its military sector is only second in importance. However, the continuous preaching and emphasis on this fact should not be allowed to result in the fact we are beginning to believe too much in our own propaganda.

This would be dangerous for the reason that other countries evaluate these issues from a completely different basis than we do. Military facts are definitely more important than foreign policy finesse to countries that are of central importance from the point of view of Finland's security.

If this is not taken into consideration, a picture of the world built on diplomatic explanations begins to deviate more and more from the actual world in which other states function. An analysis of theories, ideas, and even dreams can sometimes reveal the most important aspects of reality, but living in an exclusive world of ideas and dreams becomes dangerous as time goes by.

Rene Nyberg's work is already the second book this year which awakens Finns from the world of diplomatic ideas to the real world of international politics. Raimo Vayrynen's work "Ydinaseet ja suurvaltapolitiikka" [Nuclear Weapons and Superpower Politics], which appeared at the beginning of the year, mapped out in unmistakable terms the most important -- and thus military -- traits of the security policies of the superpowers. Nyberg's book does the same in the political reality of Finland's immediate vicinity.

Nyberg's text is a concise and rich cross section of Nordic security policy, in which military policy is in the forefront. He is compelled to treat even rudimentary issues since this area has not even been mentioned by name in Finnish debates.

Nyberg's concise 170 pages leaves the reader to wonder how the Finns have over the years been able to talk about a Nordic nuclear-free zone, for example, without even considering that reality on the basis of which all others except the Finns approach this issue.

Denmark

Nyberg's analysis of Denmark's security policy demonstrates the self-evident fact visible from even a map that Denmark is not a Scandinavian country. Besides geographically it is also of economic and military necessity a part of Central Europe.

In the NATO organization Denmark's defense sector includes areas of the Federal Republic of Germany all the way to the Elbe. A Danish general is responsible for the defense of Lubeck and Kiel, among other places. A German division, which is equipped with nuclear weapons, is under his command already in peacetime -- thus even today.

All arrangements involving international law in reference to even a small Nordic nuclear-free zone would result in an opening in the defense system of the West on Danish territory, which obstructs the mouth of the Baltic Sea and is, therefore, vital to NATO. Indeed, there should be talk about a Nordic nuclear-free zone and this should be the aspiration, but there is reason to forget Denmark. This is not just the result of the existence of NATO, but of geography.

Sweden

The fundamental idea of Swedish security policy is to position itself in the international arena in such a way that Sweden does not arouse suspicions among the superpowers, but also no expectations.

Even though Sweden came out of both world wars with just a scare, it learned the lesson of war more effectively than those countries caught in the vortex of war that defense nihilism results in immeasurable problems. In a surprisingly short time it built itself into a military mini-superpower. At the height of its power it had approximately 900 fighter aircraft. In the 1950's it had the world's fourth largest air force. It is still one of those few countries in the world which are planning and manufacturing first-line combat aircraft.

The systematic enhancement of military force also brought up the subject of nuclear weapons as a seriously considered alternative in Sweden's defense debates. The leadership of the air force has openly requested nuclear weaponry since the beginning of the 1950's. The discussion of nuclear weapons did not come to a stop in Sweden until 1968 when Sweden signed the treaty banning nuclear weapons.

Nyberg graphically illustrates the central position that Sweden's defense capability occupies in the security of Finland and the Soviet Union. Doubts

about the inviolability of the territory of a state carrying out a neutral policy will create doubts in one superpower and in the other expectations which are especially serious from the point of view of Sweden and are not a matter of indifference to Finland.

Norway

Since Norway is a member of NATO, it is planning military cooperation with the other members of NATO. The information about arrangements increasing the operational capability of Norway's airports (Collocated Operating Base Agreement), which caused a considerable sensation a couple weeks ago, has not been a secret in this area's professional literature for a long time.

Anyone who has deliberated these issues at all has understood that the existence of such an agreement is simply necessary. In Nyberg's book, the manuscript of which was completed before the alarming news concerning the agreement was made public, it is mentioned in passing as a simple routine matter.

Norway's security policy entails sea strategy above all. The development of weapons technology has resulted in the fact that Norwegian territory is of no significance as an area for launching missiles directed against the USSR. Also the seas off the coast of Norway have lost their significance as an area for launching missiles from submarines.

Norway's unique position between a ridge of mountains and the ocean naturally directs its attention toward the sea and causes its back to be turned on Scandinavia. Also the oil and gas deposits on Norway's continental shelf tie it economically more closely to Western Europe.

Membership in NATO means that it is an advance defense base for the East Coast of the United States. It includes many weapons systems, by which protection is provided to NATO's vital supply and maintenance links across the Atlantic.

USSR

Nyberg confirms two contradictory lines of development for the Soviet role in the Nordic area. Its presence in the area of the Danish Straits has clearly increased since the 1950's. Its operations there are visible and active. From the point of view of conventional warfare this is a Soviet point of emphasis in the Nordic area.

The composition, staffing, and readiness of Soviet ground and air forces in the area of the Kuola [Kol'skiy] Peninsula demonstrate according to Nyberg that its position in the area of the Arctic cap is defensive. The concept of a surprise strike to the rear of Norway's coastal defenses through Finland and Sweden seems to be theoretical and improbable on the basis of the information presented by Nyberg.

A reference to the future that is perhaps interesting from the point of view of the Arctic cap is contained in the mention made in passing by Nyberg. According to the most recent research, it appears that the technical improvement

of Soviet submarine-launched missiles is gradually transferring its strategic emphasis from the area of Murmansk to the environs of Vladivostok. This would alleviate the Nordic security policy situation structurally and permanently.

Finland

After a sharp analysis Nyberg presents a survey of a little less than seven pages on Finland's military policy premises, which is the most concise and best that has been written on this issue in a long time.

He confirms that in this era of nuclear weapons the real critical test of security policy is not a war, but the political crisis preceding a war. Thus that phase in which the prevention of a war is still possible.

The chief significance of a defense capability is that it can affect the political calculations of a crisis phase in such a way that the probability of war is reduced. He ascertains that the existence of Finland's defense establishment is more for defusing a crisis than for waging a war.

He confirms that it is wise from the point of view of Finnish as well as Soviet military interests to avoid joint operations on Finnish territory as long as possible. The Soviet Union will need its troops elsewhere in a crisis.

Finland's own security in a crisis situation will not be increased by the fact that military power is increased on its territory. Additional foreign troops will become targets of a nuclear strike regardless of whether or not they are equipped with nuclear weapons.

If the power of the defense forces is to be believed, they must, indeed, be able to defend the country. Not by winning a war, but by preventing it. This is the real national defense.

10576

CSO: 3617/58

EGYPT SEEKS COMBAT HELICOPTERS, 155MM SP GUNS

Bonn DIE WELT in German 20 Dec 83 pp 1, 8

[Article by Peter M. Ranke, Cairo: "Cairo Seeks German Arms: Egyptians Want 155MM SP Howitzers and BO-105 Helicopter Gunships"]

[Text] Informed sources in Cairo indicate that Egypt will become the second Arab country besides Saudi Arabia to request sizeable deliveries of German arms, military equipment and machines. After negotiations with German industry, the Egyptian defense ministry is awaiting the FRG government approval of arms shipments to Saudi Arabia, something that is considered likely after Federal Chancellor Kohl's visit to Israel in late January.

Sources maintain that whatever the federal government grants the Saudis cannot be denied the Egyptians. The federal government's statement last week in the Bundestag according to which Israel and Iraq are considered tense areas to which no arms would be delivered is viewed as a preliminary decision, since Egypt and Saudi Arabia were not mentioned.

After the visit of Defense Minister Marshal Abu Ghazalah to German arms factories in early November, the Egyptians have become especially interested in speedy delivery of the Rheinmetall 155 SP howitzers and the MBB (Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm) BO 105 combat helicopter to be used in an anti-tank role, for example. Should Bonn refuse, then the helicopters could be shipped from Canada where MBB has acquired a majority interest in Fleet Industries of Fort Erie where the helicopters could be built.

The Egyptians are also interested in German know-how and precision instruments for their own arms industry, as well as in joint manufacture of artillery and tanks. The Egyptian arms and munitions industry, earning about one billion dollars annually in hard currency, is Egypt's second largest exporter after oil. It earns more than do exports of cotton or tourism. The main customer is Iraq for the Gulf War, but Sudan and North Yemen are also receiving Egyptian arms and equipment. After China and Romania, Egypt is currently the largest producer of Soviet arms, without a license, to be sure. For example, the infantryman's main air defense rocket, the successful SAM 7 is copied in Cairo and exported. Also, 200 T77 tanks--modernized Soviet T55s--bought from Romania were delivered to Iraq for Combat use. This means that German weapons could also find their way to the Gulf via Cairo. Thanks to American assistance and

and partial financing by the Arab Gulf states that count on the deployment of Egyptian forces in the Gulf area in a crisis, the arms industry as well as the army and air force are being rapidly modernized. Egypt will receive \$1.325 billion in military aid from the United States this fiscal year, including \$425 million in grants. In fiscal year 1985 which begins on 1 October 84 that sum is scheduled to be \$1.1 billion. But President Mubarak has already asked for an increase to \$1.3 billion once again. Only Israel receives more from the United States. However, Egyptian rearmament and modern weapons for the 320,000 men in the army, 27,000 in the air force, 80,000 in air defense, and 20,000 in the navy have been criticized in Washington, since Egypt is increasingly circumventing the 1979 peace treaty with Israel out of regard for the Saudi money suppliers. According to Egyptian army information, a British Swingfire air defense missile assembled in Cairo was successfully tested in early December. Thirteen of these missiles are mounted on a jeep, also built in Cairo. Additionally, the Egyptian arms industry produces helicopters equipped with Hot anti-armor rockets, and the British Walid armored car. Egyptian tanks are scheduled to go into production in 1985.

In 1984, 20 Mirage 2000, valued at a billion dollars, will be delivered by France, from the United States, the remainder of the 650 M60A3 tanks, hundreds of M113 armored personnel carriers, and the last 20 of 40 F16 fighters. Egypt plans to sell 35 of the older Phantoms to Turkey.

The Egyptian air defense network is being completely renovated and equipped with electronics with the help of two Hawkeye reconnaissance and command aircraft, Hawk air defense batteries, and new command centers and structures. A \$210 million contract for that purpose was concluded with Hughes Aircraft in the United States. The biggest deal for the arms industry, however, is the planned construction of fighters. Here the possible selections include the Mirage, the F16, and the F20 Tigershark.

9240

CSO: 3620/137

UK-FRG MILITARY SUPPORT ACCORD SIGNED

Munich SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 14 Dec 83 p 1

[Article by dpa: "Closer Bonn-London Military Cooperation: Support Agreement Signed"]

[Text] Bonn--The federal government and Great Britain signed in Bonn a defense-related support accord. To date a support agreement regulating logistical assistance during a crisis of troops stationed in Germany had been concluded only with the United States. A spokesman of the foreign ministry explained that all possible costs arising from the new agreement would be borne by Great Britain. The long-term importance of the accord includes the possibility for rapid troop reinforcement and thus an accompanying increase in conventional deterrence. The support includes such fields as transportation, labor, use of civilian airports, and subsistence.

The British Army of the Rhine will construct a close combat center to train soldiers in street and house to house fighting on the NATO training area located in the depression between Detmold and Paderborn, which is also used by Germans, Dutch, and Belgians. According to the headquarters of the Rhine Army in Moenchengladbach, the facility, resembling a village and planned since 1979, will be built about 1 kilometer from Augustdorf in Kreis Lippe. The population of the area had expressed considerable reservations regarding construction of the center.

9240

CSO: 3620/136

STRONG SAUDI INTEREST IN JAGUAR 2 TANK DESTROYER

Duesseldorf HANDELSBLATT in German 7 Dec 83 p 11

[Article by hjs: "Great Interest in Jaguar 2 Tank Destroyer"]

[Text] Bonn-Thyssen-Henschel in Kassel has started deliveries of the Jaguar 2 tank destroyer to the Bundeswehr. Today the combat vehicle will be demonstrated in Munster/Oertze to a Saudi Arab military delegation that is currently touring the FRG to explore possible arms purchases by the Arab country.

The new tank destroyer, of which the Bundeswehr has ordered 162, was developed out of the gun-equipped model introduced in 1964. The Jaguar 2 is equipped with the TOW rocket system that permits action against hostile tanks at distances up to 3000 meters. It can also operate by night.

Besides training areas and military schools of the Bundeswehr, the Saudi military delegation will also visit several arms producing firms during its stay in the FRG. The agenda includes visits to Krauss-Maffei, Iveco-Magirus, Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm, Siemens, AEG-Telefunken, Thyssen-Henschel, SEL, Wegmann, Kassel, and Dynamit Nobel. The military delegation, headed by Major General Faysal 'Abd-al Mu'in and also including the military attache of the Saudi embassy in Bonn, Khalil Ibrahim 'Abd-al-Karim, is following an invitation extended by Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl during his visit to Saudi Arabia. The federal chancellor had rejected a Saudi wish to buy German Leopard II tanks, but had offered delivery of defensive weapons.

The Saudi delegation will also visit the production facilities of the Marder armored personnel carrier, the Gepard armored anti-aircraft vehicle, armored bridging equipment, tank retrievers, and other armored vehicles. The Bonn defense ministry is counting on the development of concrete purchase plans only after the conclusion of the Saudi delegation's tour of the FRG. At that time a meeting with state secretary Ruehl of the defense ministry is scheduled.

The federal government is treating the Saudi visit almost as a secret, since it fears that too much publicity will cast a shadow over the visit of Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl to Israel early next year. Arms delivery contracts with the Saudis should therefore not be concluded until next spring.

An important decision regarding arms policy was made yesterday in Brussels. Manfred Woerner, the FRG defense minister, and his American colleague Caspar Weinberger signed an offset agreement. The Bundeswehr will introduce the American Patriot weapons system that replaces the Nike missile. In return, the Americans will buy the German Roland defensive system and use it for site defense of their most important bases in the FRG.

9240

CSO: 3620/137

DEFENSE BUDGET HIKE OF 2.4 PERCENT OVER 1983 APPROVED

Duesseldorf HANDELSBLATT in German 9/10 Dec 83 p 5

[Article by ap: "47.8 Billion Mark Approved for the Hardthoehe"; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface]

[Text] /Bonn--Defense Minister Manfred Woerner can next year spend DM47.8 billion, 2.4 percent more than in 1983. Woerner's budget passed in second reading with 263 deputies approving, 196 voting against it./

Amendments submitted by the Greens, calling for reductions in acquisitions, research and development by a billion marks were rejected by large majorities.

The Social Democrats vehemently criticized the postponement of a planned hike in draftee salaries. On behalf of the SPD, deputy Brigitte Trauge stated that her party would continue its struggle for a timely pay increase for draftees.

The SPD politician also charged that the government was incapable of eliminating the promotion and utilization backlog in the Bundeswehr even with the 250 new positions. She also sharply criticized the planned cost cuts among civilian employees of the Bundeswehr. In this area 6,440 jobs are to be eliminated, the remaining employees will be hit by the zero round and the half-year hiring freeze which also affects the work of the colleges.

Defense Minister Manfred Woerner, on the other hand, drew attention to the sacrifices required from other sectors of the population and assured that draftee salaries would be increased as soon as possible, by 1 January 1985 at the latest.

Woerner stressed that Bundeswehr readiness was assured, in spite of a budget increase of only 2.4 percent. The Bundeswehr cannot be exempted from the needs of frugality, but the budget is nevertheless aimed "primarily at the threat and not financial resources." The real increases in research and development, procurement and military facilities are in any case "around or above 3 percent." With that Bonn can meet its obligations toward the Western Alliance, said Woerner.

SPD deputy Traupe, on the other hand, stressed that savings of DM600 million had been possible in procurement costs, while the actual savings were only DM100 million. In addition to an increase in draftee salaries by 1 December 1984 she demanded a second free trip home a month for transferred draftees and careerists, further funds for tutoring students whose fathers had been transferred, as well as an accumulation of resources for construction to finance housing measures. CDU deputy Lutz Stavenhagen objected that the procurement reductions proposed by the SPD would affect readiness in the future, cause cost increases, and limit the mobility of the Bundeswehr.

9240

CS0: 3620/136

WOERNER NOTES POSITIVE DEFENSE BALANCE FOR 1983

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG in German 22 Dec 83 p 4

[Article by Karl Feldmeyer: "Defense Minister's Positive Balance for 1983: Old Concerns, New Plans, and Some Points of Emphasis for Future Work"]

[Text] Bonn, 21 Dec--Defense Minister Woerner considers the unsuccessful attempt to provide schools with factual, propaganda-free information about the mission of the Bundeswehr and its contribution to the preservation of peace to have been the most serious failure in his efforts to preserve peace and the FRG defensive capability this year. "This is a defeat for our democracy," was Woerner's opinion, as he toted up the balance of his first year as defense minister to the press last Tuesday.

He said that he had carefully examined what was being taught in this field in the schools of other countries, such as Switzerland, England, France and the United States. There is reason for concern that this has not been possible in the FRG as well. If it is impossible to instill in "the hearts and minds of the young people" the realization that one must be ready to defend himself, then the FRG is in long-term peril. "A nation cannot be defended forever against its will," said the minister, but also pointed out that in spite of the above shortcomings the great majority of young men are still prepared to meet their military obligation. When asked about his reaction to Guenter Grass' proclamation that he would try to "undermine" the defensive capabilities of the Bundeswehr, Woerner replied that Grass was placing himself outside the constitution. However, the Bundeswehr would continue to defend Mr Grass' freedom.

All told, Woerner noted a positive balance for the year. Cooperation with the allies had improved, especially through the agreement with France for joint development and procurement of an anti-armor helicopter, as well as through the German-American agreement regarding modernization of air defense in the FRG. It is most important that the alliance has been able to realize its retrofitting decision while carrying out a policy proving its willingness to disarm. In addition, the minister pointed to the German contribution to further development of joint NATO strategy developed in conjunction with the decision of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group to decrease the number of nuclear warheads in Europe by another 1,400 over the next years. Since 1979, 1,000 additional warheads have already been removed from Europe.

Speaking of his own ministry, Woerner said that he had shown that the Defense Ministry can be managed. He had restored its planning rhythm. The Bundeswehr plan for 1985 had been passed. Also, he succeeded in taking the ministry out of headlines.

As a new item of information Woerner explained that the general staff course had once again been extended to the original 2 years. During the years of the socialist-liberal coalition the course had been shortened by 3 months, in spite of continual resistance by the defense minister and the Bundeswehr leadership. Critics considered 2 years to be a privilege for the attendees. For this reason they wanted to shorten the course considerably and instead increase markedly the general 3 month staff training of all career officers so as to counteract the formation of elites.

Woerner explained that he had reduced the number of Bundeswehr courses by 10 percent this year. This has a positive effect on the actual unit strength, especially on leading cadre strength.

The minister pointed out four major areas of concentration for the next year: First, a strengthening of the internal structure of the Bundeswehr as well as of training and education. Second, he will attempt to shift the mandatory course of study for all career officers at one of the two Bundeswehr colleges to a later period in their careers. This is due to a widespread dissatisfaction in the units with the situation caused by the implementation of the study rule. A beginning career officer is detailed to the course after only 15 months' service in the Bundeswehr, shortly after his promotion to ensign, before he has established a relationship to the troops as trainer and platoon leader or gained experience in leadership and in the daily life of a company.

This has led to a situation where young officers have during an absence of at least 3 years become alienated from their environment and after their return from the course are often incapable of discharging fully their tasks as platoon leader and deputy company commander. They are often dependent on the experiences of their NCOs and the latter's willingness to assist their superior. Woerner plans now to have the study course begin after 2 or 3 years' service as platoon leader, i.e. after 5 to 6 years with the troops, so that officers can continue their work after the college course with greater experience. Third, the minister announced, he would make efforts to overcome the promotion and utilization backlog. But at the same time he stressed that here the finance minister would play the decisive role, since every improvement would cost money. The fourth and fifth items on his agenda for the next year include a reform of the reserve concept and a review of long range planning. This is necessary due to the decline in the birth rate which means that by the end of the decade the Bundeswehr can no longer meet its need for draftees. Woerner said that reservists must be given new tasks corresponding to their increasing importance in view of the problem of population decline. The minister did not provide details.

Even under Apel the so-called Long Term Commission had calculated that after 1990 there would be an annual shortfall of up to 100,000 recruits. This

shortfall could only be overcome by an extension of mandatory service to 24 months, and a marked increase in the number of reenlisting soldiers. Otherwise, it was calculated, the Bundeswehr could not be kept at a 500,000 man strength. The commission also stated that the 1.2 million man mobilization strength of the Bundeswehr--this is a decisive factor in the defensive plan of the Alliance--could only be maintained if its peacetime strength would not decline below 472,000.

Although Woerner has not publicly expressed his views on this question, sources in the Defense Ministry are under the impression that Woerner is not considering an extension of the term of service to the necessary 24 months. More than 18 months are "politically impossible," it is said.

9240

CSO: 3620/136

GENERAL FORGET ON AIR FORCE'S ROLE IN EUROPEAN DEFENSE

Paris DEFENSE NATIONALE in French Dec 83 pp 97-105

[Article by Air-Corps General Michel Forget: "The Combat Air Forces in Our Strategy of Action in Europe"]

[Text] The use of the Rapid-Action Force in Europe should be very flexible and should fall within a wide range of hypotheses of crises and conflicts. The present article is based on the cases of conflict situations in Central Europe that might bring all of our forces, and our air forces in particular, into action. Its author is Air-Corps General (CPN [expansion unknown]) Michel Forget, former commander of the Tactical Air Force (FATAC)

Our defense policy, based on deterrence, is broadly approved of in our country. The essential role of our strategic nuclear forces is clearly established in that policy. If differences arise as to the evolution of these forces, they have to do with questions of a technical and financial nature, without any challenge to the end-purpose of the weapons systems and the necessity of keeping them at their threshold of credibility. As for the deployment of the FNS [Strategic Nuclear Force], it is provided for within a remarkably stable organization, that of the Strategic Air Forces and the Strategic Naval Force.

On the other hand, the nature and the volume, as well as the use, of the conventional forces that could be committed, together with the nuclear weapons called "tactical" that are associated with them, have been and still are subject to discussion. This discussion leads periodically to considerable modifications of the means provided and of their structures. True, the problem is not a simple one. It is easy to recognize that the strategic nuclear forces alone could not respond to all the forces of menace. But on the other hand, it is far trickier to evaluate the most effective volume and mode of action of the forces intended, according to the doctrine, for "testing the adversary's intentions," or "obliging him to raise the level of his aggression and thus to place himself unequivocally under the threat of our nuclear response." It is in fact a matter of navigating between two reefs--on the one side, that of the all-or-nothing strategy, with a very weak environment of conventional forces, and on the other, that of an excessively vigorous stra-

tegy of action that could impair the credibility of our nuclear deterrence. The choice of the correct course depends, in fact, on a great many factors: the concept of our vital interests, the nature of the country's political and military environment, the volume of resources available for providing ourselves with the necessary range of forces, after the priority needs of the FNS are met.

Furthermore, this explains the evolution of our strategy over these last 20 years. During the 1960's, our strategy was far closer to the all-or-nothing reef than to the other--not intentionally, but as a result of the relatively limited level of the means effectively available to us. Our FNS had a single component--the Mirage IV, with the environment necessary to it for ensuring that it was kept in operational condition* and for guaranteeing the security of the vectors. At that time, the necessity of having forces for maneuver, conventional and nuclear, whose action could be joined with that of the allies, had, of course, been clearly established. But our conventional forces did not yet have all the equipment appropriate for their new conditions of use. In addition, the end of the Algerian war, and then, in 1966, our withdrawal from the integrated military organization of NATO, were to lead to a modification of their structures and their organization. As for the national tactical nuclear armament, it was not in service. The efforts undertaken during this same period, in all areas of the design of materiel and the organization of forces, furnished, as of the 1970's, a broader range of conventional and nuclear forces. The margin for the political authority's maneuver, in the event of crisis in Europe, then became wider, and our strategy turned distinctly away from the all-or-nothing reef: the creation of the 1st Army, the placing in service of the national tactical nuclear weaponry in the units--air units first of all, and then ground units--and the practical application of the cooperation agreements with the allies. Voices were even raised in various quarters at that time against the risk of an excessively pronounced strategy of action. During the same period, though, the deterrent power of the FNS increased distinctly with the placing in service of the two new SSBS [Surface-to-Surface Strategic Ballistic Missile] and MSBS [Sea-to-Surface Strategic Ballistic Missile] components, and then the accession to thermonuclear power. But it matters little here whether those criticisms were well-founded or not. The very fact that they were expressed shows clearly how difficult it is to follow the correct heading in the face of the diversity of the interpretations to which any evolution of our strategy for action in Europe gives rise.

I. Organization and Commitment of the Means

What is appearing today through the structural reforms of the Army is indeed a modification of the conditions of our commitment in Europe. The 1984-1988 programming law has given the political authority the opportunity to review the broad outlines of our defense strategy and to specify its contours for the coming decades. "The defense policy of France," the armed-forces chief of staff recently wrote in this regard, "is characterized by the concern for

* In particular, modernization of air defense.

continuity, in its objectives as well as in the principles on which it rests.... Continuity does not, however, rule out, in the short term, certain modifications in the organization and use of the forces." Our concept of defense, based on nuclear deterrence, is not being modified. As for our strategy of action and the means devoted to it, they express the same concern to avoid the two reefs mentioned earlier. Nevertheless, the new structures of our ground forces, and in particular, the creation of the Rapid-Action Force, offer new prospects for the conditions of our military commitment.

The Rapid-Action Force tends to provide greater flexibility for the maneuvering of the ground forces. The characteristics of the deployment of it and of its reach should make it possible to envision its engagement in short times, ahead of our main coverage formation. It is possible to imagine such action as of the beginning of a crisis or considerably later--in the event, for example, of the allied defensive front's being in a direction considered dangerous for our own formation. Thus such a commitment, while at the same time materially expressing our solidarity with the European country or countries involved in the crisis or conflict, would unambiguously and immediately signify to the adversary that his undertaking directly challenges our security. On the level of principles, this goes in the direction of strengthening deterrence. In the logic of our strategy, such action cannot, of course, be automatic. In addition, neither the place nor the time at which the Rapid-Action Force might take action could be fixed in advance. Everything depends on the nature of the enemy action, the general military situation, and the evaluation, by the political authority, of the seriousness of the threat exerted by the adversary. Uncertainty is the rule in this domain. This expresses, in the present context, the flexibility with which the ground forces, whose different components will be capable of functioning either separately, in toto or in part, or rather in a grouped manner, depending on the engagement hypothesis considered, will have to be articulated. The questions thus raised are important ones. They are doubtlessly not the most difficult ones.

In the hypothesis of commitment of the Rapid-Action Force, the trickiest problem is rather to ensure action that is effective enough to be significant in the eyes of the adversary as well as in those of the allies. The problem is also to preserve the coherence of our strategy of action. The point is not to make a judgment here on the new organization of the ground forces or on their operational--and logistical--capacities either, or on the exercise of command with a considerably more complex structure. These are very important points, of a technical nature. The exercises and maneuvers to come will doubtlessly make it possible to tackle them in a concrete manner. Staying on the level of principles, though, it must be noted that engagement of the FAR [Rapid-Action Force] is a difficult operation. The main risk is not, it seems to us, to give too much scope to the initial action on the ground. The most probable risk appears to be the opposite one, and this is so for two reasons.

The general package of the means that the FAR will have available to it is known today. It shows that its defensive capacity is a serious one. But in the face of a powerful adversary, it could reach its limits quite rapidly.

Our initial commitment could then be jeopardized, as the result of difficulties in the course of the very tricky deployment phase, in which our elements are most vulnerable. It could also be jeopardized as the result of an excessively unequal ratio of forces in the field, leading to the more or less rapid ejection of our troops. Under these conditions, we would have weakened our main battle corps for a nil military result and deterrent effect, if not negative ones. The second reason is of more general import. The fact of committing several thousand men in a crisis is not a symbolic act. From a political act, it becomes an act of war when things hot up. It then endangers our entire defense formation. There is nothing, indeed, to prove that the adversary will make the distinction, in his reactions, between our forward forces and those of the rear. That is why, with the means as they are known today, our initial commitment will never be too strongly assured.

Since the risk of excessively weak commitment is thus the one to be feared most, that is the one that we must forearm ourselves against on a priority basis. For this purpose, special attention should be paid to the operations conducted in the third dimension.

II. The Third Dimension

a) Mastery of the Air

The problems of an eventual air-transport plane and those of helicopters will not be analyzed here. The capital importance and the specific role of these means are known. But what, on the other hand, should be forcefully called to mind is that no operation can be carried out under acceptable conditions of security if the means committed--troops, transport planes and helicopters--do not have a minimal freedom of action in the face of the threat from the adversary air forces. This condition--an essential one under any hypothesis--would be decisive during deployment of the FAR, at which time the formation is most vulnerable. This brings up already the role of the air forces, whose offensive and defensive capacities, combined with those of surface-to-air artillery, must ensure, at the desired time and place, the safety of our troops and of their support. Furthermore, the FAR, composed of relatively light units, even though they have strong antitank weaponry, has more limited capacities in terms of heavy-firepower materiel. If our units should run up against a powerful adversary, the problem of their support would arise--and in any case will arise. Different ways of solving this problem are possible. Those offered by attack air forces, whose concentration capacities and speed of action are known, meet the conditions of engagement of our units and the nature of their combat.

Thus, mastery of the third dimension is essential for ensuring the safety of the FAR's maneuver and giving its engagement all its strategic significance. It must also be specified what air forces are involved: ours, those of the allies, or both on a cooperative basis.

b) National Forces or Allied Forces?

Assigning the missions of coverage and support of the FAR to our air forces alone--more precisely, to our tactical air forces alone--obviously does not

correspond to the logic of the most probable situations. Our ground units have every chance of being committed with a far vaster allied formation. It is at such a level, at least, that the air operations would then be conducted, in a maneuvering space extending well beyond that of our own units. Under these conditions, reserving to our combat air forces a limited space adapted to the narrow zone of engagement of the FAR would be both ineffective and hardly conceivable--ineffective because it would be contrary to the principles of use of air forces, and hardly conceivable because of the problems that would be posed by the coordination of our actions with those of the allies. Inversely, the hypothesis of air support of the FAR by the allies alone could be adopted, of course, in view of the very wide range of crisis situations that can be envisioned in Europe. But what must be avoided is that such a hypothesis be made a principle.

On the one hand, it is not, in effect, logical to envision entrusting to our partners, before the fact, the entire area of air maneuver, in an essentially air-land operation, the significance of which is important for us too, on the level of strategy. In addition, the participation of our own air forces procures a twofold advantage. It is a guarantee of effectiveness for certain particularly tricky phases of the operation, such as the deployment of our ground units. It also makes it possible to reinforce more surely, by means of appropriate actions, the resistance capacity of our units on the ground in the event of a critical general situation. In such a case, the distribution of the air forces could, in effect, be a delicate matter. Our own support needs would then be satisfied all the better in that our combat air forces would be more closely committed with those of the allies. A negotiation is not conducted with empty hands.

On the other hand, the principle of air support of the FAR by the allies alone leads straight to the concept of a commitment of our combat air forces linked strictly, in time as well as in space, to that of our main battle corps. But this concept runs the strong risk of not responding to the reality of the situations. The adversary, who could not enter into our game a priori, may force us to give it up, by, for example, engaging his air forces against our forces, those of the forward area as well as those of the rear. Thus would we be led to react ourselves, by air actions not only defensive but doubtlessly offensive too.

Finally, on the level of deterrence, it seems difficult to us to set out a principle that leads in the end to a separation between the engagement of the FAR and that of our air-land formation as a whole, with its nuclear forces. For us, it is a matter, in effect, of preserving our possibilities of maneuver, notably that of our air forces, as well as possible. It is also, and mainly, a matter of leaving the adversary in the greatest possible uncertainty about the scope and nature of our reactions.

Thus the logic of the most probable crisis situations in Europe, the search for effectiveness, and the reality of the fight in the third dimension show that our combat air forces--the tactical forces in particular--must be capable of being present, in toto or in part, alongside those of our partners, as of the time that our first ground units are themselves committed within an

allied framework. This does not, in any case, impair our autonomy of decision. It does not at all prejudice the effective conditions of engagement of our air forces--conditions that will be defined in function of the scope of the crisis. But it seems difficult to foresee breaks in continuity in the maneuvering space of our air forces, except for those imposed by the workings of deterrence. For on any hypothesis, within the framework of a crisis in Europe, the air operations would have every possibility of being modulated, in their extent as well as in their power. They would be modulated in function of the value that each adversary attributed to the stakes of the crisis. They would be modulated also in function of the idea that each of them formed about the other's threshold of tolerance. Such uncertainties would only result in assignment of greater importance to air strategy, as a direct expression of deterrent maneuvering.

III. Conclusion: Overall Maneuvering of Our Forces

In conclusion, a broader and, especially, faster action capacity for our ground forces constitutes, in principle, an advantage for the conduct of our defense strategy in Europe. In the nuclear environment that we have, though, the commitment, before our battle corps, of ground elements included in an allied formation cannot, a priori, be isolated from the overall maneuvering of our forces, and especially our air forces. The real amplitude of the operations, ground and air, is, of course, a function of the seriousness of the crisis and of the conditions of our initial engagement. The intervention of the Rapid-Action Force constitutes, in itself, only a hypothesis. Furthermore, its volume, its reach and the moment of its deployment could not be predetermined. In all cases, though, such a strategy implies that our combat air forces have sufficient capacities for taking part if necessary, with the allies, in the protection and support of our forward-area ground units, for launching the defensive and offensive operations necessary for the security of our territory and of our coverage forces, while at the same time preserving their own capacities for nuclear response.

This expresses all the importance of their role.

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HERNU ON 1983 BUDGET, NUCLEAR DETERRENCE, RAPID-ACTION FORCE

Paris DEFENSE NATIONALE in French Dec 83 pp 5-20

[Speech by French Defense Minister Charles Hernu to the 36th Session of the Institute for Higher Defense Studies (IHEDN) on 15 November 1983]

[Text] When speaking to the audiences of the Institute for Higher Defense Studies in 1981 and 1982, I had occasion to refer to the threats against international peace and security. Last year, at around the same time, an impressive number of conflicts called "local" or "limited" could not help but excite considerable uneasiness about the future course of the relations between nations and peoples; and my language has always been that of realism and truth, without evasiveness or optimism of command. And it must be noted that there is today a conjunction of imbalances and tensions such as the world has known only on very few occasions since the end of the last world conflict.

1983: the "Terrible Year"?

The year that will end in a few weeks will doubtlessly figure among those about which the historians will explain to us later that it was at the same time a "terrible year" and a turning-point year leading to a new configuration of the international political and strategic map. I shall not expatiate on the precedents in this regard, for in the domain of historical analysis as elsewhere, "comparison is not reason," even if the years 1947 and 1954 come quite readily to mind.

The factors that make 1983 a remarkable year are numerous and convergent. I cite first of all the evolution of the East-West relationship of forces, particularly in Europe, and their effect on international security. The trends that I will list are not, to be sure, new ones--and I had occasion to speak of them in considerable detail right here in 1982--but as of a certain moment, there can occur what is called in Marxist philosophy a "qualitative leap," in which a quantitative change causes a change in the very nature of a situation.

Thus it is that in Europe and Asia, the continual and imbalanced buildup of new means of massive destruction is in the process of bringing about an in-depth modification of international relations. More particularly, the number of

mobile SS-20 missiles is still growing--135 rockets at the time of NATO's famous "dual decision" in December 1979; and I note that the Soviet officials said at the time that there was an "approximate balance"--297 rockets when Chairman Brezhnev announced a unilateral moratorium on the deployment of those missiles in March 1982, and 360 today. Those 360 missiles carry 1,080 warheads that in a dozen minutes can hit more than 56 countries of Europe, Asia and North Africa, containing nearly two-thirds of the world's population. These weapons have the particular character of holding hostage the countries of the Old World, the security of which is thus detached from that of the American continent, which finds itself alone out of their reach. This represents a potentially tragic situation for those countries that depend entirely on the American security guarantee: such is the case notably for the nations of the European and Asiatic continents that do not have a nuclear deterrent force.

In the face of this, the United States and the member countries of the integrated NATO system are confronted with the very significant deadline dictated by their sovereign dual decision of December 1979. After 2 years of discussions, the Geneva negotiations have not led to a satisfactory outcome; and unless there is a last-minute surprise, the Pershing rockets and the Cruise missiles will therefore have to be deployed. Our hope is that this beginning of correction of the imbalance will in the last analysis make it possible to found the negotiations on more solid bases and lead, at one moment or another, to an agreement providing for the lowest possible level of armament. A great country such as the USSR could not balk in this situation, and all the more so because the deployment of the American rockets would not be a reason for breaking off the discussions. Indeed, the continuing deployment of the SS-20's--99 since the beginning of the negotiations--has not been taken by the United States as a pretext for suspending the Geneva talks.

In the rough game thus started, each of the superpowers is trying to put all the chances on its side. For what is at stake is, in the long run, the future of European security. West Europe represents an economic power equal to that of the United States and twice as big as that of the USSR: the relationship of forces between the two great powers will depend on the side to which the balance in Europe tips.

It is therefore not surprising that international tension is increasing as the date for deployment of the Pershings approaches, and all the more so in that bloody events outside Europe are feeding this generalized deterioration. A civilian airplane is coldly shot down with its 269 passengers on the edge of the Soviet air space. Two hideous attacks mow down 297 young soldiers, including 58 French, whose only purpose was to bring a little peace to distressed Lebanon and protect the populations of Beirut after the massacre of the Palestinians of Sabra and Shatila. An island of the British Commonwealth is invaded by a superpower without any preliminaries, in contempt for the rules of law. Libya, as in 1980, invades Chad, and is stopped by the French peace force--and so on. It would, of course, take too long to list all the tragic events, all the new conflicts which, in 1983, have been added to the old ones: Afghanistan, Iraq-Iran, the Western Sahara, Cambodia, Central America, the horn of Africa, etc.

These confrontations increase the dangerousness of any false steps in the present situation, which is characterized by the singular importance attaching to solution of the matter of the Euromissiles.

Our country is present in the great debates of our era, and it brings to them its message in favor of peace and liberty. In view of what is at stake as this year 1983 ends, we must understand that new attempts will perhaps be made to strike blows against us and attempt to break our resolve. France will not let itself be intimidated. It will respond, if necessary, at the right place and time.

The position of France in these difficult circumstances cannot result from whatever the factors of the current situation are; it cannot be dictated by short-term considerations: our evaluation about the measures to be taken in order to preserve peace, security and independence for our country are based on a number of principles that are subtended by a will.

Balance, Deterrence, Peace

If I wanted to sum up the foundations of our policy in a few words, I would cite:

- the balance of forces, at the lowest possible level, which is the condition of peace;
- deterrence, which is the foundation of the security of France, in respect for its alliances and its natural solidarities;
- the possession of an independent defense apparatus, notably in its nuclear component, which is the instrument of our country's independence, of its space for liberty;
- the French people's will to defense, which gives our weapons their deterrent and defensive value.

In the absence of any one of these various elements, the peace, security, independence and liberty of France would be gravely threatened.

The principle of balance applies first of all, of course, to Europe. It is the risk of imbalance in Europe that could give rise to war or loss of independence--or, more probably, both at once. Who could believe that a people as proud as ours could one day accommodate themselves to any form of protectorate, from wherever it might come? The temptation to submission--to which France succumbed in 1938--has led us to war and servitude. We have had to regain our liberty and our dignity at high cost--and it is still not certain that we have achieved it by our means alone. Never has peace resulted from a people's loss of liberty: the one is not exchanged for the other. True peace is the kind that is born of liberty.

That is why the balance of forces is necessary not only for preventing the outbreak of an eventual conflict but also, in a more immediate way, for doing things in such a way that we cannot be subjected to any measure of intimidation, any loss of liberty.

But what is valid for Europe--the immediate field of our alliances and our friendships--holds true in the other regions of the world also. Now there are two geographical areas with which France has formed close bonds that derive from history and that hold singular importance for us: Africa and the Near East.

France has a great many friends on the African continent. A quarter-century after the process of decolonization was begun, our country has not only maintained close bonds with the states of Africa, but thanks to the establishment of relationships of equality, thanks to the existence of a certain number of common values, the circle of our friendships has also expanded and become stronger.

The numerous treaties of defense or military assistance that have been negotiated between France and the states of Africa are the legal expression of a profound solidarity. France is not animated by any expansionist or neocolonial intentions. But its African partners know that the guarantee that it represents is a solid one: France would not intervene against their will; it can act only at their request. This fact has recently been demonstrated again in Chad. And, I add, contrary to what happened in 1980, when the Libyan troops were able to occupy Ndjamena.

In the Near East, France has maintained relations with Lebanon for centuries. Our military presence in that country derives from them, both in Beirut and in UNIFIL. This also explains the nature of our political action: for France, Lebanon cannot be a pawn, to be moved or transferred, at the will of the various powers, on the Near East chessboard, whether it is conceived of in Israeli-Arab terms or in East-West terms. This distinguishes us sufficiently from other powers acting in the region. Lebanon must exist by itself, for itself, without foreign presence or interference, within its borders, within the framework of freely chosen institutions. This is a noble objective, to which our country's soldiers have paid a heavy tribute, alongside the other contingents, the American one in particular, which also was hit very hard. It is especially tough to suffer blows in a peace mission, in the face of an adversary that considers itself faceless, and that is therefore all the more contemptible.

In sending its Super Etendards to silence the batteries that were shooting at us last September, France used its right of self-defense. That right is a permanent one.

The balance necessary for the existence of a Lebanon that is finally free and independent, and a balance also for preventing the destabilization of the entire Arab world such as would result from a collapse of the Iraqi-Iranian front! France does not hide its concern over avoiding an invasion of Iraq, and it is true that it supplies that country with armaments, by virtue of commitments, some of them old, from even before the Iraqi-Iranian war. This clear and principled position should not be confused with the attitude of those who shamefully deliver war materiel to Iran--or to both belligerents at the same time. On the other hand, France has no declared enemy, and therefore no enmity toward Iran, a great and ancient nation.

France, a power with a population of 50 million, has only a fraction of the economic and demographic potential of each of the superpowers; thus it is clear that our national interest is to prevent conflicts, to forestall war and avoid the arms race. That is why our country has, in the military area, a resolutely deterrent approach. This holds true in the three areas in which our forces may be led to act:

--in order to deter any major aggression against France and its vital interests, our country has provided itself, for the last quarter-century, with a nuclear force that has to be constantly modernized in order to keep up its credibility in the face of the evolution of the threats; and these nuclear forces, by the mere fact of their existence, reinforce security on our continent by the uncertainty that they create vis-a-vis a potential aggressor;

--in Europe, our conventional forces and, in particular, the French forces in the FRG and Berlin, evidence our desire to prevent any conflict, and our commitment; but the fact remains, nonetheless, that France, as a medium-size power, cannot by itself be the ultimate guarantor of the security of its allies in Europe;

--overseas, our forces marking our presence--nearly 28,000 men in 1983, not including Chad and Lebanon--to which the units on alert in metropolitan France can be added shortly, must prevent the outbreak of imminent conflicts and ensure the maintenance of peace; thus our policy of prepositioning forces seems to us a solution well-suited for situations such as those with which our British partners have had to cope in the Falklands. In the same way, a strategy of prevention of conflicts has facilitated the maintenance of the peace and security of most of the French-speaking African states since their independence, enabling them to devote their efforts to economic and social development. There has been one notable exception to this--Chad: the departure of our forces, requested several years ago, did not, of course, contribute to the stability of that lacerated country, the object of the covetousness of its Libyan neighbor. But there too, France intervenes primarily to deter: under shelter of the barrier that "operation Manta" represents, African diplomacy can exert its efforts to ensure to Chad the return of its integrity and sovereignty, within the framework of national reconciliation. It is not a certain thing that this outcome will occur rapidly or easily: France can facilitate the Africans' action, but it cannot substitute for them.

The same is true for Lebanon, where our soldiers are carrying out the noblest and most difficult of tasks: there too, the multinational force is playing the indispensable--and, unfortunately, sometimes tragic--role of shield, without which a return to civil peace and to the reestablishment of a sovereign state would be impossible.

This logic of deterrence depends on the existence of a modern and independent military instrument. The 1984-1988 programming law ensures the means for our policy. The equipment provided for in the law will be acquired at the rate planned, as is evidenced by the 1984 draft budget passed by the National Assembly. The personnel of the armed forces too are bearing their share of sacrifices in the indispensable effort for rigor; but there is no haggling over the security of France. Thus the Ministry of Defense is the only one

whose expenditures and purchases are programmed in such a way as to ensure our capacity of deterrence and response in all circumstances. I would like to speak in some detail here on the priority lines of action within the framework of the programming law:

--the modernization of our nuclear forces;

--the setting-up of our Rapid-Action Force.

Maintaining the Credibility of Our Nuclear Deterrence

Between now and 1994, our nuclear means will undergo an important transformation, the meaning of which I would like to acquaint you with.

The maritime component of our strategic nuclear force will go from five to six missile-launching nuclear submarines as of 1987. A seventh submarine--the first of a new, more silent generation--will be built between now and 1994. Through refittings, four of the existing SNLF's [Missile-Launching Nuclear Submarines] will be equipped with M4 missiles. Thus the theoretical number of warheads carried on board will go from 80 in 1983 to 176 in 1985 and 496 in 10 years. Why such a development? First of all, I point out that France is equipping itself with multiple warheads 10 years after the United States, 10 years after the USSR and several years after the United Kingdom; thus we are not starting any kind of arms race in this area.

The figures for the increase in the number of our warheads are, of course, sizable on the scale of France. Certain observers or propagandists are blaming us for this ahead of time, as it were. But let them remember the parable of the mote and the beam. There is no doubt that we have to learn when we note that the number of warheads carried by the Soviet long-range and medium-range rockets has gone from about 2,900 in 1975 to 8,000 in 1983--that is, a rate of increase of nearly 70% warheads per year. And this trend shows no sign of falling off. The United States, for its part, is reviving its efforts in this area with the deployment of the MX and Trident-II rockets.

France, contrary to the superpowers, is not engaged in such overarmament. Our country aims quite simply at making sure of the minimum level of its deterrent force in the face of the evolution of the threat. And I believe that we shall succeed quite well in doing so, thanks to the constant efforts by the engineers and military personnel involved in the designing and placing in service of our nuclear means.

And I think that no one today can doubt the reality of our deterrent capacity. The efforts of those who would like to prevent the modernization of the FNS [Strategic Nuclear Force] are the best guarantee of its credibility.

In the face of the studies and developments being carried out on antimissile systems on both sides of the Atlantic, France has the duty to continue to provide itself with the means that make it possible to maintain this credibility at the threshold of sufficiency. Two billions of dollars and roubles being spent to impede the penetration of a family of strategic weapons, together with the talk challenging the very notion of mutual deterrence. All this calls, on our part, for the reinforcement of our deterrence.

As regards the land-based component, the hardening of the second group of strategic missiles will be continued. In this regard, I would like to stress here the fact that the 18 missiles of the Albion Plateau are an indissociable part of our strategic nuclear force, as are the missiles carried on board the submarines. The S-3 rockets are sanctuary weapons, in a strategy that is not an antioffense strategy but a doctrine of overall deterrence. France believes in deterrence, in the prevention of war, and not in a nuclear conflict that it is hoped would be "limited" to a geographical area or to a category of military targets.

The deployment, as of 1992, of the Hades rocket, the successor to the Pluton, will give our tactical nuclear force a distinctly improved survival capacity. Because of the range of the Hades--more than 350 kilometers--tactical nuclear weaponry will be less exposed to strikes by the adversary, while at the same time giving the chief of state far greater freedom for evaluation. If our country were forced to consider crossing the nuclear threshold in order to reestablish deterrence, the Hades would thus strengthen our capacity for preventing war by increasing the uncertainty in the mind of an eventual aggressor.

In the air domain, France will deploy, during the programming period, the medium-range air-to-surface missiles--first on 18 Mirage IV-P strategic bombers, and then on the Mirage 2000 planes. Thus our air component will be considerably less vulnerable to antiaircraft defenses, whose effectiveness has been constantly improving. Finally--and this is a fundamental element--the placement in service of the Astarte airborne communications system will ensure transmission of the necessary orders under the best conditions, no matter what the circumstances.

France is thus striving to have permanently available the means to ensure the credibility of its deterrence: neither more nor less.

Neither more, because that would not correspond either to our means, which are not those of a superpower, or to our philosophy, which rules out any form of coercion or intimidation.

Nor less, because we would then lose our space of liberty, our capacity for having an influence on the course of events; our action in favor of peace, of liberty, of human rights, our very identity, would thereby be compromised. It is not by chance that there is a broad consensus of our people in this regard.

The moral legitimacy of this policy aimed at preventing war by deterrence is hardly disputed, as is attested by the remarkable letter from the French Catholic bishops meeting in Lourdes on 8 November.

Therefore, an independent deterrent force, suited strictly to our needs. And it is for this reason that it cannot be counted along with the rockets of one or another of the superpowers, no matter what the negotiations on the intermediate-range rockets or in the START talks.

France is keeping its forces at the threshold of credibility. Therefore it could not enter into a discussion without prior fulfillment of the three interdependent conditions recalled by the president of the republic, Francois Mitterrand, before the United Nations on 28 September last:

- reduction of the arsenals of the two superpowers to a level such that the nature of their forces is changed;
- correction of the imbalance of the conventional forces in Europe, and elimination of the terrible threat that the chemical and biological weapons constitute;
- a halt to the destabilizing up-bidding in the area of antimissile, antisubmarine and antisatellite weapons.

Thus may it be possible some day to tackle the real problems of nuclear disarmament head-on, with respect for the security and sovereignty of all.

The FAR: Independence and Solidarity

The creation, within the Army, of the FAR (Rapid-Action Force) has been considered by all observers as the principal innovation of the programming law. And it is a fact that the five-division regrouping, including a powerful force of antitank helicopters, with a view to rapid actions of broad scope, will constitute major progress in the rational organization of our means.

This force will have 47,000 men, with its five Army divisions, when the setting-up of it has been completed. The air and naval needs [as published] will act in support of the FAR, in modes to be determined by the chief of staff of the armed forces in function of the circumstances. The FAR has aroused many comments and a few questions. And this is natural, since this force has the particular characteristic of being able to act as the case may require in each of the three areas into which the defense of our country falls.

The FAR--a mobile force, of multipurpose character and with great firepower--could naturally be called on to participate directly in defense of the national territory--either autonomously, against a line of penetration not covered otherwise, or in support of the 1st Army. The FAR is thus an integral part of our country's overall deterrence.

The FAR could also, in the event of crisis in Europe, fill our commitments to our allies in a concrete way. Here also, the forms of action could vary with the circumstances or the place. By virtue of its constitution and its mobility, the FAR obviously would not be tied to any "slot" in the "forward battle." France remains the only judge of the principle of an action and solely responsible for its modalities of application. But as of such time that France made the decision to use the FAR, our closest neighbors and allies would have the benefit of a very valuable reinforcement. This would be particularly true for the FRG, to which France is linked by the Elysee Treaty, which constitutes a sort of "alliance within the alliance." Here also, the logic has to be above all the logic of prevention of war: the FAR is a conventional ground force, capable of acting with punch, and its maneuver is not

tied to our nuclear means; but a potential aggressor could not help but hesitate to confront physically the nuclear, independent and continental power that our country constitutes.

Finally, the FAR is called on to be present overseas: the operations in Chad and the participation in the maintenance of peace in Lebanon evidence this fact. Two observations are necessary here. Contrary to what is said in some quarters, our armed forces currently have the personnel necessary for coping with new crises overseas, if the circumstances should call for our presence.

I mention that we presently have in Lebanon and in Chad nearly 5,400 men of the Army and the Air Force, in addition to which there are 2,500 sailors of the naval group stationed in the eastern Mediterranean. On the other hand, we have in the DOM-TOM [Overseas Departments and Territories] 18,600 men who could be committed elsewhere and replaced, if the situation should so require, by units from metropolitan France. Furthermore, 8,700 persons are prepositioned in friendly foreign countries, and I note that 2,000 men are permanently on alert in metropolitan France, ready to leave for anywhere, 24 hours a day: this is more than was needed for the Kolwezi action. These capacities are scheduled to be improved: between now and 1986, three regiments will be professionalized, along with the seven regiments that already have been. Thanks to development of the highly esteemed formula for volunteering for long national service, within the framework of the provisions passed by the Parliament last June, our possibilities for action will be strengthened. The first results in the area of this volunteer service are indeed extremely encouraging: 6,600 young people have volunteered in 3 months. These candidates are entirely to the honor of our youth, who are thus testifying to their will to defend our country.

Contrary also to what I have sometimes stated, but in conformity with what I indicated in June, on the occasion of presentation of the programming law, we demonstrated in Chad the validity of our air-transport system: the new-generation Transall, the in-flight refueling planes, the re-engined DC-8's of the COTAM [Military Air-Transport Command], the leasing of Boeing 747's from our national companies. And we have the possibility of expecting the successor to the Transall, which we hope will be built on a cooperative basis. As for naval assistance, it is effective, as is shown by the OLIFANT [expansion unknown] group in Lebanon.

Thus, the human and material resources for our security policy exist. But what would our armaments and their support, as sophisticated as they may be, count for without the will to defense of the French people, men and women? The surge of national unanimity following the abominable attack in Beirut is powerfully fortifying from this point of view. Likewise, the adherence of the vast majority of the French political forces to the government's very firm position in favor of balancing the forces at the lowest possible level illustrates our country's resolve.

Hope

I began my remarks on a somber note, a reflection of the troubles that the world is going through. However, the course of events also gives us a few

solid hopes: from the current turmoil there may arise a more satisfactory order of things, the bearer of a future for our continent.

The year 1983 could also lead to the worst of situations: a West Europe giving in to renunciation, to the law of the strongest; a Soviet Union whose expansionism is encouraged by its external successes; an America both more egoistic and more interventionist; and finally, a Third World threatened by growing Balkanization, of which Lebanon and Chad are among the most unfortunate victims.

But one also perceives a few trends--still fragmentary, sometimes hidden from view--that can in future, if we know how to encourage them, result in real progress; I am thinking in particular about what is currently happening in Europe.

The matter of the Euromissiles has produced some extraordinarily profound reactions in the countries of Europe--particularly in those that are completely dependent on American nuclear weapons for their defense. And among those states is the FRG, a constituent part of a divided people.

In the face of this problem of armaments in Europe, those who challenge them are not all animated by the same motives.

The traditional pacifists present a genuine antimilitarism and a sincere hostility toward nuclear armament. Dialogue will always be possible--and is absolutely necessary, for that matter--with the representatives of these tendencies. We can dispute the appropriateness or validity of their message; but we cannot deny it. It is up to us as responsible authorities to demonstrate that peace and security are based on the will to defense and the means of deterrence.

There is also a considerable fringe of persons whose avowed neutralist pacifism covers other aims that are less avowable. Or to put it more simply, there is the party of fear, whose members renounce self-defense out of fear of "provoking" the ire of a too-powerful neighbor. We all know where such cowardly and ignorant behavior leads--behavior whose shameful stages have been marked, as regards our country, by the surrenders of Munich, of Vichy, of Montoire. We will never go that route.

Finally, there is a profound and immense aspiration to greater independence, toward the search for an identity. This is particularly clear in the FRG--and even, in other, less distinct forms, in the GDR: how could one believe that young people born nearly 20 years after the end of World War II could accept the Yalta order without reacting? The division and partitioning of Europe will be increasingly rejected by the coming generations. And it is natural that this feeling should be particularly strong among the Germans, and that it should preoccupy the great powers.

France has the good fortune to have control of its destiny, to be one land within historic borders. Our responsibility is thereby all the greater. This feeling was expressed by the president of the republic with particular force in his speech to the Bundestag in Bonn on 20 January 1983.

The energies that are rising in the youth of the countries neighboring us are being expressed today through the distorting prism of pacifism, and they run the risk of yielding to the temptations of an ill-omened neutralism, which would create a void. The unity of Europe would not at all be facilitated by this. It is up to us to act in such a way that these forces are oriented toward activities that enable the European states to assert their national identity more clearly. We understand well an attempt to break the offer [as published] inherited from Yalta would lead to war. The only acceptable solutions will therefore have to be slow and gradual ones, so that no one feels threatened in his existence or his security. For this purpose, we must do everything to deepen, freely and sovereignly, the relations among the states of West Europe. For it will not be possible to do anything serious in a scattered situation: the identity of Germany can be defined only within the broader framework of Europe, which is itself divided and in search of itself.

The question of the Euromissiles seems, in this regard, to be a catalyst which, in the last analysis, should facilitate greater cooperation among European states.

Since 1982, France and the FRG have felt the need to put into force, for the first time, the military clauses of the Elysee Treaty, unapplied for 20 years. Since 1982 we have seen a revival of the joint projects in the armaments field; in this regard I can confirm that decisive progress is being made as regards the Franco-German combat helicopter. I have signed framework agreements for cooperation with Spain, Italy, Belgium, Denmark and Greece, which are added to the solid bonds already woven with the FRG and the United Kingdom. I note, in my talks with my colleagues of the neighboring states, that a sort of new awareness is arising under the pressure of events. The profound evolutions under way, sustained by our conscious efforts, will be able to bring about greater solidarity among the free European states, whose own personalities will be further asserted vis-a-vis the two superpowers, but without, for all that, renouncing the existing alliances, which are indispensable to the peace and security of the world.

These outlooks may seem indistinct or remote if they are related to the immediate calendar of needs for a deeply troubled world. It is the duty of France to light the way that leads farther, beyond the obstacles of the moment.

Thus it is that our present efforts will bear their fruits for peace, for independence, for liberty.

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DEFENSE MINISTER ON FUNDS CONSTRAINTS, MISSIONS, PROCUREMENT

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 22 Dec 83 p 5

[Interview by Knut Falchenberg: "Anders C. Sjaastad Urges Military to Make Best Possible Use of Funds"]

[Text] "Military leaders would do well to talk less about procurement shortages and concentrate instead on the best possible use of what has been granted," defense minister Anders C. Sjaastad told AFTENPOSTEN. "The fact is that no government sector can add up all its claims not to have received over a period of years and say that the Norwegian people "owe" so much money.

"We should also be careful about saying that our military defense is inadequate and that that is only due to the shortage of funds. That could mislead people into asking whether military appropriations are being wasted, which, in turn, could lead an adversary into believing that Norway's defense is something that can be dismissed as inferior," said cabinet minister Sjaastad.

Norway's top military commander, General Sven Hauge, used strong words in his commentary on the government's long-range military plans. He wrote about reduced defense capability, about cutting the military, his goals and regretted the present state of our military forces.

"Is General Hauge's description a fair one?"

"It is a military commander's duty to express his idealistic goals for the military and what he intends to spend money on. In this process, there is always a tendency to stress shortages. But I want to point out that although you have plans you may wish to carry out, there must be room for changes along the way. Unfortunately, it has become customary to say that defense budget increases only cover certain things and when new, top-priority needs surface, it is said that these must be added to the already established budget. That cannot possibly be reasonable. For example, when we decide to invest money in NATO surveillance planes (NAEW) or allied prestocking, the aim is precisely to strengthen our military defense capability and to prevent war. Hence, such initiatives should not be in addition to other projects; on the contrary, we

must accept that such important decisions mean that less important aims must be relinquished somewhat," said Sjaastad.

The cabinet minister is also concerned about Norway's defense capability in view of the threat that faces the nation:

"Our plans are based on the pioneering analyses which formed a part of the Defense Commission's work in 1974. At that time, the threat was evaluated and viewed in terms of Norway's military obligations within NATO. From that perspective, it is easy to understand that much of what the Soviet Union has at its disposal could be important to the NATO balance as a whole, without directly affecting the situation in Norway. It is not so that each time the Soviet Union acquires a new weapons system our chances of defending ourselves are weakened. Tanks, for example, have only limited value in some parts of North Norway. Hence, it does not matter a great deal how many tanks the Soviet Union has at its disposal if our military can only utilize so many tanks in Norway," said Sjaastad.

"Many of the new top-priority initiatives are aimed at reinforcements abroad and only indirectly strengthen our forces. Is it not of little value to purchase electronic command systems when you lack well-equipped soldiers to command?"

"If you were to ask a sergeant, he would no doubt opt for the best possible hand weapons. But if you were to ask a general, he would want to establish a balanced military defense system, including good arms, but also equipment that could indirectly support the units in battle. No military commander would want to be without modern communications or surveillance equipment. In other words, we must find a reasonable balance between guns, boots and canons on the one hand and the ability to command troops by means of modern electronics on the other. In this matter, we essentially follow the advice of military experts," said Sjaastad.

"Are we becoming increasingly dependent upon foreign troops to defend Norway?"

"Ever since 1949, it has been clear that we depend upon our allies. What is new is that we have updated old, written military agreements regarding reinforcements, making them more realistic. In some instances, we have had to choose between initiatives to strengthen our own national defense or use the money to pave the way for allied assistance instead. In the last few years, we have more often opted to rely on allied forces rather than our own because the choice of allied assistance has been the most effective in preventing war.

"It is possible that a good Norwegian soldier is better suited than a foreign soldier to fight in Norwegian terrain during the winter. Nevertheless, a foreign soldier may be better able to prevent war specifically because he demonstrates NATO's concerted will to stand behind Norway," said Sjaastad.

CIVIL DEFENSE GETS ROLE IN MILITARY PARAMEDICAL FIELD SERVICE

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 23 Dec 83 p 4

[Article by Rolf L. Larsen: "Civil Defense Units Prepare For Paramedical Field Service"]

[Text] Civil Defense units throughout the country are now in the process of updating their medical and technical equipment. "We are now greatly changing our philosophy. While up to this point we have mainly concentrated on the ability to transport injured persons to hospitals for treatment as quickly as possible, we will now be prepared to perform paramedical service in war-torn areas. We have been allocated a record-high budget to implement this," department director Sverre Servan with the Civilian Preparedness Directorate told AFTENPOSTEN.

War experiences in the Middle East, for example, have prompted Norway and several other countries to change their philosophy with respect to civil defense.

Approximately 21 million kroner have been allocated in the 1984 budget to replace civil defense medical equipment. About 16 million kroner were allocated in the 1983 budget. Some four to five years ago, the annual budgeted amount for such equipment was about 3 to 4 million kroner.

"This equipment will be distributed throughout the country among the 108 locations in which we have an organization. We plan to purchase advanced first-aid equipment, which will be operated by professional medical personnel. We are primarily stressing oxygen supply and intravenous equipment. In addition to medical equipment, we also plan to purchase new technical equipment, which will enable us to enter collapsed buildings and basements. We will be using portable cutting torches and a new drilling equipment, provided with its own electric power unit. With this type of equipment, we should be able to cut through reinforced concrete, among other things," said Servan.

War experiences in the Middle East and Vietnam are now also changing civil defense philosophy in Norway. "Acts of war in the Middle East, in particular, increasingly point to the unpleasant fact that there can be much personal injury among civilians as well. In order to aid these victims as quickly as

possible, advanced first aid is being used together with medical equipment and hospitals in the field. This is the model we now also want to put to use," said Servan.

He pointed out that experiences in the Middle East have been discussed in several disaster conferences. These international conferences have now led a number of countries to change their philosophy of civil defense. "Talks with Red Cross representatives in the Middle East also support this view. We must place greater emphasis on medical assistance and first aid in the more exposed areas," said Servan.

"Will you now stress medical and technical education for persons called into civil defense service?"

"Obviously, it would be very advantageous for persons who shall handle this equipment to have had daily experience in these areas, but enlistments will not be made on a preferential basis. Over the next few years, we plan to call up approximately 2,500 to 3,000 persons. They will get the same basic training now given to 55,000 persons in civil defense today," said Servan.

8952

CSO: 3639/55

FORMER ARMED FORCES CHIEF: PRESTOCKING SHOULD BE IN NORTH

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 9 Jan 84 p 5

[Article by Lars Hellberg: "Hamre: Prestocking Should Be in Troms"]

[Text] "I am shocked that leading Norwegian politicians seem to think that prestocking equipment for a U.S. marine brigade in Trondelag is militarily equivalent to prestocking in Troms," General Sverre Hamre told an AFTENPOSTEN correspondent. The former minister of defense also stressed the need to speed up planned prestocking for a Norwegian mobilized brigade in North Norway in order to offset the difficulties connected with U.S. prestocking in Trondelag.

The issue was raised during the parliamentary Defense Committee's visit to the United States last fall. At that time, Major General Alfred Grey, chief of the U.S. Second Marine Division, expressed satisfaction with the choice of Trondelag. "This choice gives us an opportunity to engage in in-depth fighting. In a given situation, we could move both southward and northward," remarked the chief of the division, which also includes the brigade earmarked to come to Norway's assistance.

Hamre, who spends part of his retirement life visiting friends and colleagues in the United States, pointed out that Grey uses a different premise than that which should apply to responsible Norwegian authorities. "As far as a U.S. operational chief is concerned, it is a question of coming to Norway's assistance and, in that case, Trondelag may seem equally as suitable as Troms. But a Norwegian defense chief's first responsibility is to defend North Norway," Hamre responded to AFTENPOSTEN's query about his evaluation of the situation.

"I must admit being shocked when I read in AFTENPOSTEN that Thor Yaudsen, deputy chairman of the parliamentary Defense Committee, "did not want to rule out that we may have been one-sidedly concerned about the northern threat." The reason for the prestocking agreement was the defense of North Norway. The question as to whether "prestocking in the Trondelag area would give the U.S. marine brigade coming to our assistance more flexibility than the eventual prestocking in Troms" is of no interest in this case," he pointed out.

He expressed concern about what might happen to prestocking plans for a combined Norwegian regiment in North Norway.

"Norwegian and U.S. authorities agreed that Trondelag was a less advantageous choice militarily. In order to remedy that, Norway agreed to provide transportation facilities, primarily snowbelted vehicles. As minister of defense, I also received clear-cut assurances that we would be given additional funds totaling 1.5 billion kroner to prestock equipment for a new Norwegian regiment (brigade) in North Norway," said Hamre.

"I no longer have a complete overview of the funding situation, but I have the impression that this part of the plan has been more or less buried. The interesting part is that Norwegian prestocking has now been included in the Norwegian-U.S. agreement," Hamre pointed out.

He did not want to discuss the reasons for choosing Trondelag. "It is clear, however, that this choice will delay U.S. assistance in the defense of North Norway. Hence, our military leaders specifically requested that we stock materiel for a new combined Norwegian regiment in north Norway."

"That, however, does not prevent many Norwegian politicians from questioning the planned Norwegian prestocking in light of 'the U.S. satisfaction' with Trondelag?"

"That would be a misjudgement, in complete conflict with all the conditions which formed the basis for U.S. prestocking," said general Hamre. To justify his statement, he referred to the guaranties given him as minister of defense and to the non-military reasons submitted by U.S. negotiators for choosing this site.

8952

CSO: 3639/55

BRIEFS

LORAN-C STATIONS BEING EXPANDED--The Joint Defense Communications Network in Norway is expected to propose that we expand the navigation system Loran-C by adding a new big station in the Vardo area, according to HAUGESUNDS AVIS. This station would aid in accurately positioning vessels involved in seismic investigations connected with the oil activity in Norwegian waters. The estimated cost of the expansion is 60 to 70 million kroner. According to HAUGESUNDS AVIS, the Joint Communications Network will alternatively suggest building a chain of smaller Loran-C stations, spanning across Bo, Vesteralen, Rolvsoy, Vardo and Bjornoya. Oil companies seem to think that this mini-chain solution would be best. Per Engen, chief engineer with the Joint Defense Communications Network, told Norwegian Wire Services (NTB) that the committee which has been studying the Loran-C expansion will submit several proposals, but he would not yet confirm which of these proposals the Joint Communications Network feels is best. [Text] [Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 7 Jan 84 p 25] 8952

CSO: 3639/55

BOFORS GETS CONTRACT TO DEVELOP NEW ANTIAIRCRAFT MISSILE

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 23 Dec 83 p 6

/Article by Erik Liden: "Bofors Develops New Antiaircraft Robot"/

/Text/ The armed forces are going to develop at Bofors a new anti-aircraft missile with a 7-kilometer range and with a night sight as a supplement to the missile 70 which the army has already purchased.

The new missiles will have a two kilometers longer range and a stronger explosive action since it has been possible to reduce the electronics. There will be a TV camera and an infra-red sight besides a laser beam (beacon) which guides the missile towards the aerial target which the missile gunner singles out with his sight.

The missile will be mounted on the new caterpillar vehicles from Hagglunds, caterpillar vehicle 200. Two missiles will be mounted on the gun carriage at the same time. Recharging missiles will be stored in the vehicle. In a forward caterpillar vehicle there will be a local reconnaissance radar which will get information from the larger "Giraff"-type radars which Ericssons Radio Systems i Molndal will deliver. By means of a TV monitor and a control level the officer directing the fire will aim the missile's sight towards the objective.

Development

On Thursday the government gave the Armed Forces Material Administration, FMV, permission to start the army's currently largest development project by appropriating for the time being 400 million kronor for developmental work at Bofors, Molndal and Ornskoldsvik.

AB Bofors will get 300 million kronor for missile development, Ericsson 72.5 million kronor for radar development and Hagglunds 2.5 million kronor for adaptation of caterpillar vehicles. Twenty-five million kronor will later pay for the infra-red and connecting equipment.


All the manufacturing will be in Sweden, and the first deliveries of the series at the end of the 1980's will have a value of a little more than 1.8 billion kronor in today's money.

This new missile 70-system will be the defense forces' first real mobile anti-aircraft defense on account of the caterpillar vehicle placement and it can quickly support armoured and infantry brigades in southern Sweden and the Norrland brigades in the north.

Four Billion

The caterpillar vehicle equipment can also be used with the current missile-70 with five kilometers range and with only daylight sights. When the missile-70 with laser sighting is delivered at the beginning of the 1990's the army will have invested close to four billion kronor in this system.

The three firms signed on Thursday afternoon contracts with FMV for the developmental work which begins in 1984.



The new anti-aircraft missile of the army, missile-70 with laser sight, is placed on a caterpillar vehicle and is guided by a radar laser, infra-red and TV sights. Range 7 kilometers, 1988 series orders for 1.8 billion kronor.

6893

CSO: 3650/91

MILITARY PERSONNEL AGREE ON OVERTIME RULES FOR SUB HUNTING

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 21 Jan 84 p 8

[Article: "Agreement Reached on Overtime for Sub Hunting"]

[Text] Labor has done its part to create a more effective defense when it comes to hunting foreign submarines and similar situations.

This contribution was made in the form of an agreement that gives the military the right to use military and civilian personnel to an unlimited extent around the clock to accomplish the tasks of the military.

"There was a debate last summer in which labor agreements were blamed for hindering submarine hunting," said Margot Odman, a representative of TCOs (Central Organization for Salaried Employees National Government Civil Servants Section).

"Actually, that assertion was incorrect. No agreement has ever hindered effective preparedness for such incidents. Nevertheless, we now have an agreement that regulates the work of all military and civilian personnel within our defense system," Margot Odman said.

All Unions

In addition to TCOs, the agreement with the State Employment Board was signed by the State Employees Union (ST) within LO (Federation of Trade Unions) and the negotiating cartel SACO/SR (Swedish Confederation of Professional Employees National and Local Civil Servants Union).

The agreement is to be utilized under two circumstances:

During temporary times of alert within the military, for example while hunting foreign submarines;

When the commander in chief has ordered a state of alert due to unrest abroad. One example of this type of situation is when the military was placed on alert in connection with the declaration of martial law in Poland in December 1981.

The question of an agreement for such incidents actually came up for the first

time as a result of the events in Poland just over 2 years ago. Since then, there has been a provisional agreement.

Outside The Law

According to the permanent agreement, when the military is placed on alert, all employees are required to work, regardless of the provisions in the working hours restriction act.

Under normal circumstances, overtime compensation is paid after the employee has worked his normal 8 hours.

In the new agreement, the normal working time is doubled, after which overtime compensation will be paid.

9336

CS0: 3650/100

INDUSTRIAL PROJECTS COOPERATION WITH CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 11-12 Dec 83 p 2

[Text] Prague--The proceedings of the third meeting of the Joint Committee for the development of technical, economic and industrial cooperation were completed 2 days ago. Heading the Greek delegation was the Deputy Minister of National Economy Kostis Vaitzos, and on the Czechoslovakian side was Mr Urban, minister of foreign trade.

The agreements and discussions in Prague have settled a series of important matters and laid the foundation for further increase in economic exchanges between the two countries.

As regards the free repatriation of political refugees, pending matters are on their way to a final solution. The Czechoslovakian side accepted the scope of the Greek proposals.

In the area of industrial cooperation, there was agreement on two important projects. The first concerns the construction of four granaries by Greek companies (the Elefsis shipyards, etc.) with Czechoslovakian technology. DEII [expansion unknown] needs two of them, and the Soviet Union will buy the other two. The second project concerns the gasification of Greek lignite. With the completion of testing (5,000 metric tons have already been sent) within the next 4 months, the project will enter its final phase.

Technology and Trade

The possibilities have been examined for the transfer of technical know-how to small and medium Greek firms for the manufacture of spare parts and accessories for Czechoslovakian mechanical equipment, which will export to the international market.

The two sides also agreed to increase bilateral trade by 50 percent within 2 years in order to reverse the decreasing trend of the last few years. For the sake of obtaining balanced development, they emphasized the need to expand imports of traditional Greek industrial products, especially in the area of textiles.

In the area of agricultural products, it was confirmed that this year's Czechoslovakian imports of citrus will continue during the coming months. It is calculated that citrus exports to Czechoslovakia will reach 27,000 metric tons as opposed to 12,000 last year.

The two sides also reviewed the various aspects of the possible development of tourism. It was agreed that both countries will take the necessary measures for the stimulus of the new forms of social tourism along with the development of traditional tourist exchanges.

12570

CSO: 3521/121

LABOR RALLY CALLS FOR INDEPENDENT TRADE UNIONISM

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 11-12 Dec 83 p 2

[Text] At the Sporting hall yesterday, the trade union organizations ADISK (Free Democratic Trade Union Movement) and ASDIK (Free Civil Servants Trade Union Movement) held a mass rally of a large number of cadres of the workers' and civil servants' trade union movement from both the private and public sectors. Most of those assembled were elected cadres of labor organizations from many Greek cities.

Also present at the rally were representatives from the world of politics. Tens of deputies and former ministers, headed by Mr K. Mitsotakis and Mr K. Stefanopoulos, represented the "New Democracy." Mr K. Laskaris, deputy former minister and, read a message from New Democracy leader Mr Averof to those assembled, while telegrams came from former prime minister Mr Georgios Rallis and former ministers Mr Boutos, Mr Taliadouros and Mr Tsaldaris. Also in attendance were delegations from EDIK [Democratic Center Union] and from the Liberal party.

The main speakers, on behalf of their organizations, were Presidents Khr. Karakitsos of ADISK and K. Papakostas of ASDIK. Mr Mitsotakis and Mr Stefanopoulos also spoke.

All the speakers favored an independent, free and genuinely democratic trade union movement. They denounced the PASOK [Panhellenic Socialist Movement] government and the government trade union movement PASKE [Panhellenic Militant Workers Trade Union Movement] for antidemocratic maneuvers that aim at the take-over and the partisan conquest of the workers' and civil servants' trade union area by PASKE and the two other movements of the KKE [Greek Communist Party] (ESAK-S [United Antidictatorial Labor Movement--Cooperating]) and of the KKE-int. (AEM [Antidictatorial Labor Front]). As was characteristically emphasized, these three trade union groups "will remain in the Greek workers' consciousness as the thoughtless claque for the anti-labor plans and deeds of the PASOK government. That claque has shamelessly gone against the workers' interests and has pushed their movement back into past periods reminiscent of the country under foreign occupation."

The New Democracy ascribes particular significance to free trade unionism while rejecting trade unionism that serves other purposes in sacrificing the

workers' interests. Among other things, this was accentuated in Mr Averof's message, which was read at the Sporting meeting. This message concluded that because of hard times, we need all healthy democratic forces to gather together, unite, and cooperate so that we can confront our opponents' totalitarian plans, with the workers' interests as our criterion. In his message, Mr Averof denounced the conference of the GSEE [Greek General Confederation of Labor] as "a spurious conference of front men, which is meeting in order to designate other front men--supposedly elected--who will be placed at the head of the GSEE."

The spurious nature of the conference was also denounced in a New Democracy communique.

12570

CSO: 3521/121

NATIONALIZATION MAKING PASOK FINANCIAL POWER

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 17 Dec 83 p 1

[Text] "The wholesale nationalization of companies is concentrating in the hands of the PASOK [Panhellenic Socialist Movement] party machine an enormous economic power that allows PASOK to place under its absolute control a large part of the population and of the national economy. At the same time, the machine is acquiring the possibility to manage without any control large sums, which will be spent according to party instructions." This was the subject of New Democracy deputies I. Palaiokrassas, G. Panagiotopoulos and A. Andrianopoulos' interpellation given yesterday in the Parliament. They added that as a result of the nationalization so far of 16 firms, the uncontrolled disposition of 3.2 billion dracmas in 1983 is becoming possible.

It is specifically reported in their question that the 16 firms nationalized so far employ 23,500 persons, while their exports are worth 800 million dollars. The same firms will have losses of 15 billion dracmas in 1983 and of 30 billion in 1984, while their bank borrowing will reach 80 billion in 1983 and 100 billion in 1984.

The interpellation continues:

"We are dealing with very important firms, that 'happen' to be export firms, most of which are so big that they control their respective areas with enormous wealth and economic size. They are open to every kind of exploitation by the party machine. If PASOK uses the government to continue the implementation of its plan, the operation of both the free democratic economy and other democratic institutions is threatened. This is so because:

"First, most of the employment sector will be under party control.

"Second, vast sums, represented by the 'unsupported' expenditures of Law No 3.323)55--as amended--can now be spent according to party instructions.

"Third, these firms' deficits (30 billion dracmas in 1984), which will certainly increase geometrically under party management, create a third fiscal deficit, which is deceitfully excluded from the budget, whose real deficit will be 507 billion dracmas in 1984."

REINSTITUTION OF CONVERTIBLE LIRA ACCOUNTS

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 9 Jan 84 p 1

[Text] Ankara--The decision enabling exporting finance firms to lend the foreign currency credit they bring in from abroad at any interest rate they wish makes foreign currency credit cheaper than credit in Turkish liras.

According to the new "convertible lira account" implementation, exporting finance firms will be able to borrow from international money markets with repayment terms of up to 2 years. They will then be able to offer foreign currency loans in Turkey. Interest rates on such loans, which will not be protected by exchange rate guarantees, will be set by market conditions.

Second Credit Market

It is expected that when the new system, introduced by Decree No. 28, goes into effect a second credit market will come into being in Turkey and that interest rates in this market will remain below rates charged on commercial bank loans. While current interest rates on bank loans remain at over 50 percent, the interest rates on this new type of loans will be determined by adding a currency exchange risk differential on rates charged in international credit markets. When the Turkish lira's annual devaluation rate--currently estimated at around 30 percent--and the costs and the commission of the brokerage institution are added to the prevailing interest rates on international credit markets, the cost of such loans comes out to be about 12 to 14 percent less than the 50 percent interest charged on bank loans.

Supporting the New Market

The public sector will play a guiding role in the efforts of the exporting finance firms to borrow in international markets in order to meet the additional foreign currency demand which emerged after the new foreign currency and foreign trade regulations went into effect at the beginning of 1984. The directive based on Decree No. 28 and enabling "exporting finance firms to borrow in foreign currency at short terms not exceeding 2 years" led to the funding of export incentive loans through foreign currency borrowing. This new facility given to exporting finance firms--which, in essence, is a repetition of the method extensively used in 1977 and following years--also grants them the authority to provide limited banking services.

Borrowing System

The borrowing system to be used by exporting finance firms approved by the Undersecretariat of the Treasury and Foreign Trade will operate as follows:

Exporting finance firms will procure short or medium-term--not exceeding 2 years--loans from abroad, if necessary with the guidance of the Central Bank or the Treasury. The borrowed funds will then be brought into Turkey with the permission of the Undersecretariat of the Treasury and Foreign Trade. The interest to be paid on the loan and other expenses will be freely negotiated between the Turkish firm concerned and the lending international institution. Currency exchange differentials to arise on funds borrowed by the exporting finance firm will be paid by the firm.

The exporting finance firm will then be able to lend the funds it borrowed from abroad to companies and individuals doing business in Turkey, and the interest rate will be determined through free bargaining. This way, exporting finance firms will be providing limited banking services. The finance firm will be responsible for making sure that the loan is repaid in convertible funds or in foreign currency.

Investments with Incentive Documents

Beside exporting finance firms, entrepreneurs with incentive documents will also be able to resort to overseas borrowing. It will be possible to use this method for acceptance credits, prefinancing credits, merchandise credits and medium-term credits.

The new system introduces a new borrowing method in Turkey whereby entrepreneurs may choose to borrow in foreign currency from overseas--rather than in Turkish currency from domestic banks--at generally lower interest rates than those charged on domestic loans.

9588

CSO: 3554/124

PAKDEMIRLI ON GOVERNMENT'S ECONOMIC POLICY

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 9 Jan 84 pp 1,11

[Interview with Undersecretary of the Treasury and Foreign Trade, Professor Ekrem Pakdemirli, by correspondent Yalcin Dogan]

[Text] Ankara--The economy now has a new "brain": Undersecretary of the Treasury and Foreign Trade, Professor Ekrem Pakdemirli, a technocrat who is known as a "superministerial undersecretary" in economic circles. We discussed with Pakdemirli the recently announced "import regime" and a series of related economic decisions. Our conversation with Pakdemirli, whom I visited with my colleague Kenan Mortan, was as follows:

Dogan: Honorable Pakdemirli, we will talk about the latest economic decisions in depth later on. But first, what was the response of the business world to your decisions? That is, how was that response reported to you?

Pakdemirli: Some came and said "you put butter on our bread"; others said "you burned us." In other words, we heard different aspects of the response.

Dogan: Who gained and who was hurt? Can you tell us about that?

Pakdemirli: I am having that issue examined. Let us see if the government has given all it can or if they think that it has. If the government has provided a facility, has it been missed? I am having that looked into. What will happen on this issue and to whom? I have six separate studies under way on this issue.

Dogan: Now, if you wish, let us go into the essence of this issue in a systematic manner.

Pakdemirli: Ask whatever you wish.

Dogan: Then let us start with an issue that has drawn the attention of broad masses: the importation of cigarettes, alcoholic beverages and luxury goods. Consumer products such as cigarettes and whisky will be freely imported and freely sold. Those who import these products will have to pay a certain amount of money to a special fund. But since these products will be freely sold, how will you prevent them from being brought into the country through illegal channels and being sold in the market without paying money to the fund? Since they will be sold freely, how will you know that they have not been smuggled? Furthermore, if they are smuggled, the fund will lose revenue.

Pakdemirli: You have probably traveled abroad. If you have noticed, Japanese photographic and motion picture cameras have little aluminum strips bonded on them. You cannot take these strips off easily. When that aluminum strip is bonded onto a product, it is known that the customs duty has been paid for that product. We will also have strip like that. It will be a strip that makes use of advanced technology. It will not be an ordinary stamp; it will be bonded onto luxury goods, cigarettes and whisky. When a product carries that strip it will mean that its customs duty has been paid and the revenue has been deposited in the fund. When the citizen sees this strip he will know that the product is not contraband. Otherwise, he will know it has been smuggled.

Dogan: You lifted restrictions on the importation of certain goods that are manufactured in this country. You took that decision to force Turkish industry to compete with foreign manufacturers. Can such a decision eventually become a major roadblock in Turkey's industrialization? Or, can the Turkish industry compete with foreigners? If it cannot, would the country's industry collapse? How will the domestic industry compete with the prices of foreign-manufactured goods to be sold here?

Pakdemirli: We lowered the customs duty on raw materials our industrialists use. We followed the following basic principle in changing customs legislation: We looked at manufactured goods and their semi-processed and raw material entries. We reduced the customs duty on raw materials to zero to 15 percent maximum. We imposed the 15 percent tax for the following reason: For example, we have government-owned industrial organizations such as Petkim [Petrochemical Corporation] and Etibank. We were worried that if we reduced the customs duty on their products to zero we could imperil their production. We set a customs duty of zero to 15 percent on [imported] raw materials, 15 to 30 percent on intermediate goods and semi-finished products and 30 to 40 percent on finished manufactured products. Of course, there are exceptions.

Dogan: From the industrialists' perspective...

Pakdemirli: If our industrialists are still worried with a protective customs duty of 40 percent, I would not be able to call their operation a rational one especially since there is no customs duty on their raw materials. Because a protection of 40 percent is not trivial. The 40-percent protection is on finished products, not on raw materials. Consequently, one must first look at the level of technology of the firms which will encounter problems even under these conditions. Or, one must see if the competition is cutting the price excessively. If there is reason to suspect that dumping is at issue, I can subject imports to authorization overnight. This can be controlled. You can put the imported product in question on a list of goods subject to authorization, and thus you can control both the quantity imported and its price. That is how you can protect yourself against dumping. But if there is no dumping and certain industrialists still say that they cannot survive, then one must seriously examine the level of their technology. Those industries must modernize themselves.

Dogan: Otherwise, that industry or company will collapse.

Pakdemirli: It may collapse. If we do not have a comparative advantage in certain branches of industry and if we have not been able to develop the needed

technologies in all these years, then we cannot force all our citizens to buy products at high prices simply in order to perpetuate certain industries.

Dogan: If a product is manufactured at home, does not the lifting of restrictions on its importation lead to an additional foreign exchange drain, especially at a time when there is a shortage of foreign currency?

Pakdemirli: No. Before, our mentality was one of substituting imports with local products in order to save foreign exchange. Now, we are more liberal in our basic principles. Every product may be imported as well as exported. Export industries can be protected and encouraged by certain means, but they are always open to competition. That was the situation in Iran at the time of the Shah. At that time, Iran began manufacturing automobiles, and they cost less than our own automobiles. Meanwhile, imports flowed in freely. But the structure of the industry was so healthy that it could compete--it still does--against the imports even though the doors were wide open. The Iranian automobile industry produced 125,000 cars in the last year before the revolution. Our best automobile production figure has been 45,000--far below 125,000. In other words, there is great merit in opening up the industry to foreign competition. Competition will force industrialists to operate more rationally and to manage their costs more efficiently. Some foreign exchange may be lost, but more foreign currency will come in by the resulting prosperity.

Dogan: The importation of any product, say a car...

Pakdemirli: That would of course be very expensive.

Dogan: Apart from that, would not a monopoly price emerge in the country?

Pakdemirli: When liberalization takes effect, Turkey's 45 million citizens will put their money in the banks, and then they can pay for imports.

Dogan: Who will have that much money in Turkish currency? Where will the foreign currency come from to buy, say, a Mercedes?

Pakdemirli: The system is a liberal one. Mercedes is not the only automobile in the world. There are better vehicles on the market, but they are not well known in Turkey. There is Volvo, for example. There are American cars. Mercedes comes to mind as a luxury car first because of the proximity of Germany. If certain people are monopolizing such markets, I think that when liberalization takes effect other individuals can also become importers by contacting the manufacturing companies.

Dogan: One of the major implementations introduced by the new import system is the establishment of a fund. Actually, the fund existed last year for certain imported products such as margarine, car batteries and battery cells. What is the difference in the implementation of the fund this year? How are you planning to use the fund?

Pakdemirli: The fund covers more products now. We also changed the purposes for which the fund will be used.

Dogan: Will the entire fund be used in housing construction?

Pakdemirli: Yes, we will use the entire fund for housing.

Dogan: How much money do you expect the fund to generate?

Pakdemirli: We expect around 125 billion Turkish liras [a year]. We can get another 125 billion Turkish liras from bank resources. Because banks will offer loans for housing. This totals up to 250 billion Turkish liras. The citizen who wants to build a home will naturally contribute 200,000, 300,000 and perhaps 400,000 Turkish liras of his own. All these add up to quite large sums.

Dogan: How much do they total up to?

Pakdemirli: With the accumulated money 250,000 to 300,000 housing units can be built.

Dogan: Do you not think that is a rather high figure? You are saying that 250,000 to 300,000 housing units will be built with the money to be generated by the fund and through other resources. Is not that figure a little too high?

Pakdemirli: No, it is not. You will see how it will be done.

Dogan: When will this system begin to work? When will the buildings rise?

Pakdemirli: We have the Public Housing Law. It has its regulations. We are gathering data to see if everything is functioning smoothly. Then we will examine how the housing cooperatives are functioning and how they are supervised. After doing that we will oil the system to make it work faster.

Dogan: Will the cooperatives be given any priority?

Pakdemirli: If the cooperatives work well and convert the money to buildings and make them habitable quickly--in other words, if they are successful--they will be supported to the end.

9588

CSO: 3554/124

NATURAL GAS SALES RISE, TO CONTINUE IN 1990'S

Rise of Gas Sales

The Hague ANP NEWS BULLETIN in English 9 Jan 84 p 3

[Text] Groningen, 9 Jan--Sales of Dutch natural gas rose by four per cent in 1983 to 73.9 billion cubic metres, ending a four-year downward trend, The Netherlands Gasunie said today.

Exports of natural gas rose by two per cent to 35.6 billion cubic metres, and inland sales by 6.5 per cent to 38.3 billion, managing director George Kardaun said in his new year report.

Sales to industry rose by 6.5 per cent, despite energy savings in this sector, as more companies turned to gas as an alternative to oil.

Despite price increases which came into force on January 1, natural gas remained the cheapest fuel for householders and small firms, at 62.66 cents per cubic metre, he said.

Sales to France were 30 percent up to 7.4 billion cubic metres (5.7), to Germany up two per cent to 16.8 (16.5), to Belgium 18 per cent down to 5.6 (6.8) and to Italy and Switzerland stable at 5.8.

Exports To Continue

The Hague ANP NEWS BULLETIN in English 21 Jan 84 p 1

[Text] Amsterdam, 20 Jan--The Netherlands, the world's third largest natural gas producer, has reversed an earlier decision to cease gas exports in the 1990's, government sources said today.

Belgium, France, West Germany and Italy are keen to import more Dutch gas when their contracts expire in the next decade, the sources said. A spokesman for Gasunie, the state-controlled gas company, added they were also exploring the possibility of building a gas pipeline to Britain, which does not at present import Dutch gas.

The sources said the countries wanted to go on buying from The Netherlands since Dutch supplies were more assured, politically and practically, than those from the Soviet Union or Algeria.

The original decision to cease exports was aimed at preserving supplies for home use. But government forecasts of the need to boost state revenue in the 1990's plus an upward estimate of the size of reserves had contributed to the change of plan, officials said.

The Netherlands exported 35 billion cubic metres of gas in 1983. Total gas sales at home and abroad brought the state about 18.3 billion guilders (5.81 billion dollars) last year or 17 per cent of government income, an Economic Ministry spokesman said.

CSO: 3600/5

PARTICIPATION IN ANTARCTIC RESEARCH URGED

Brussels LA LIBRE BELGIQUE in French 3 Jan 84 p 10

[Excerpt] In response to a question posed in September by Deputy Burgeon, who wanted to know why Belgium, due to lack of funds, has decided not to participate in the research being conducted in the Antarctic region where the "King Baudouin Base" has been established and what have been the results of this research up until now, the Minister of Budget, Science Policy and Planning recalled, in the Chamber's bulletin of questions and answers, that after 1966 Belgium had cut back on the maintenance of a scientific base in the Antarctic because of the high cost of this activity.

"In the science policy sector," he went on to say, "other priorities have been set which are more in consonance with our country's economic perspectives."

"We should note," the minister emphasized, "that the results have not produced the prospect of applications of interest to our economy."

This statement appears to be diametrically opposed to the renewal of interest in this part of the world felt by world economic and industrial sectors!

Fortunately, that is not the view of Francois de Gerlache, 23, the younger son of Baron Gaston de Gerlache de Gomery, commander of the Belgian Antarctic expedition in 1957-1958 and founder of the "King Baudouin Base." Francois is one of the 10 members of the British Antarctic expedition headed by Commander Chris Furse.

The announcement of the "event" represented by the return of the De Gerlaches--there have been three successive generations--to the Antarctic gives Commander Gaston de Gerlache, chairman of the Belgian Antarctic expeditions affairs committee, the opportunity to renew his previous appeals for a revival of Belgian scientific activity in the Antarctic.

And this less for reasons "of national pride" (although such reasons do exist: Japanese maps are now showing as "Yamato Mountains" the "Queen Fabiola" chain which was discovered in 1960 and registered internationally under that name by Major Derom, commander of the third Belgian Antarctic expedition which was conducted following the International Geophysical Year) than for a concern that Belgium remain "a party of interest" within the framework of control over exploitation of the resources of the Antarctic.

"Although it is one of the signatories of the Antarctic Treaty, Belgium is in danger of seeing itself excluded from the SCAR (Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research)," Gaston de Gerlache recalls, "because its membership in that organization depends directly upon scientific activity in the region."

At the official Belgian level it would seem that the possibility of subsidy of research activity in the Antarctic must be forgotten for the moment "but there is nothing preventing our thinking about more modest projects," with the participation of the private sector. In any event, it is regrettable that Belgium at this time has had to decline offers to participate in Antarctic expeditions proposed by Japan and Poland, not to mention the possibilities of cooperation with New Zealand which appeared to be present a short time ago.

Belgium must continue to be fully associated with all these activities which are of capital interest for the future of the world, and the time seems to have come for renewal of the Belgian presence in this "region" of the earth and at the same time for improvement of the Belgian representation's credibility within the framework of the Antarctic Treaty.

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'ACID RAIN' NOW FOUND TO COME MOSTLY FROM USSR, EAST BLOC

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 17 Dec 83 p 12

[Article: "Two-Thirds of Sulfur Fallout from Abroad, USSR Promised to Reduce Sulfur Emissions"]

[Text] Porvoo--The fallout of sulfur in Southern Finland is just as great as it is in Southern Scandinavia where sulfur has already inflicted definite damage to the environment, as stated in the report of the sulfur work group, which was submitted to Environmental Minister Matti Ahde on Friday.

Also the origin of sulfur fallout coming from beyond Finland's borders is identified for the first time in the report. Central Europe is not the chief culprit as has previously been the general belief. The greater portion of sulfur being transported over great distances is from the Soviet Union and other CEMA-countries. Sulfur also comes from the German Democratic Republic, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.

Minister Ahde stated that he has held discussions with Soviet officials. They have stated that the Soviet Union will attempt to reduce sulfur emissions by 30 percent before 1995.

Four-fifths of the source of total sulfur fallout has been identified in Finland. One-third of the total fallout is of domestic origin.

Finnish sulfur emissions are around 600,000 tons reported as sulfur dioxide. Together with Norway, Sweden, and Denmark Finland has proposed that Europe and the countries of North America reduce the total emission of sulfur by 30 percent from the 1980 level by the year 1993. The basis for this proposal is serious concern about the acidification of waters and soil, states Section Chief Olli Ojala of the Environmental Ministry.

Ojala has acted as chairman of the work group which submitted the report. The report includes a plan for identifying those alternatives by which sulfur emissions can be limited.

The intent is that Finland could along with others present definite plans for reducing sulfur emissions in the fall of 1985. At that time those countries bound by treaty to reduce their emissions will assemble in Geneva.

According to Ojala, nine countries have already announced that they have reduced emissions. Sweden, Norway, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Switzerland, Austria, Canada, France, and the USSR are the first. France has announced that it has reduced its emissions by even 40 percent.

Cost of Report 1 Million

The work group directed by Ojala is recommending measures in the report that will cost approximately 1 million markkaa. The cost of reducing sulfur fallout will not become known until the results of the report are implemented.

According to the information collected by the work group, Finland will be able to deal with the reduction of emissions quite easily.

Total emissions can be reduced from the present 600,000 tons to a level between 420,000 tons and 550,000 in the next 10 years according to the work group by reorganizing the structure of energy management and processing technology in industry. Significant reforms in processing technology have already been accomplished in the cellulose industry. They will also be implemented in the iron and steel industry.

Of the new technology, Ojala mentions, among other things, fluidized bed furnaces.

The transition from heavy fuel oil to low-sulfur coal will also reduce sulfur emissions. Heavy fuel oil makes up 35 percent of domestic emissions.

In assessing development prospects the work group has come to the conclusion that emissions from fuels can be reduced in the next 10 years even though energy needs will continue to grow at a rate of 1.5 percent.

Sulfur from East and West Polluting Finland

The Neste Corporation also has opportunities for reducing the proportion of heavy fuel oils with a high content of sulfur. According to Director Airi Laiho, the company is placing an emphasis on light products, which will mean that as many products as possible will be extracted from heavy oil. "At this time the amount of heavy fuel oil left from production is 25 percent, which is relatively small, but the proportion can still be reduced," states Laiho.

The power plant which will be completed in December 1984 at Helsinki's Salmisaari is one of those projects from which the environmentalists want to reduce the amount of sulfur emissions.

Present plans do not call for the installation of desulfurizing equipment at the plant. According to Environmental Minister Matti Ahde, Salmisaari is one of those plants to which attention will be directed. An actual decision on this matter will be made by the Uusimaa Provincial Government, which will be able to require the installation of sulfur purification equipment at Salmisaari as a condition for operating the plant.

According to the Helsinki Municipal Energy Utility, the cost of the Salmisaari Plant will be 550 million markkaa, to which purification equipment would add an additional cost of 100 million markkaa.

In its plans the energy utility has already taken into consideration the fact that the purification equipment will be installed. The plant has been designed in such a way that the assembly and installation work can be accomplished afterwards.

The Salmisaari Plant is a power plant that will produce electricity as well as heat so that it is difficult to provide an accurate estimate of the effect of purification equipment on the price of electricity, for example. According to the calculations of the energy utility, the effect of purification equipment on the kilowatt-hour price of electricity would, however, be quite small, approximately 1.5 pennies per kilowatt hour.

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